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UTAH STATE DEVELOPMENTAL : 
CENTER, and the UTAH STATE 
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN : 
SERVICES and the STATE OF UTAH, 
Defendants/Petitioners. 
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Did the Court of Appeals err when it determined that the safety precautions 
required to be utilized by an intermediate care facility for the mentally retarded when 
allowing a 40-year old severely mentally retarded woman, with schizophrenia and a 
seizure disorder, to use a regular playground swing were within the knowledge of a lay 
jury and did not require expert testimony to establish the applicable standard of care? 
COURT OF APPEALS OPINION 
The Court of Appeals opinion is reported at Collins v. Utah State Developmental 
Center, et ah. 1999 UT App 336, 382 Utah Adv. Rep. 21. A copy is attached hereto as 
Addendum A. 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals' decision was entered on November 18, 1999. No petition 
for rehearing was filed. An Ex Parte Motion for Extension of Time in Which to File a 
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari was filed and an Order was issued by the Supreme Court 
on December 20, 1999 granting defendants an additional thirty days, up to and including 
January 19, 2000, in which to file this petition for a writ of certiorari. A copy of the 
Order is attached as Addendum C. 
This Court has jurisdiction to review the Court of Appeals' decision under Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) and (5)( 1996). 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
The following determinative provisions are set forth in Addendum D to this 
petition: 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-1, et seq. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-3(11) 
Utah Admin. R. 432-152-4(4.401 (A)( 1994) 
Utah Admin. R. 432-152-4(4.701 (A)( 1994) 
Utah Admin. R. 432-152-4(4.701(B)( 1994) 
Utah Admin. R. 432-152-5(5.103)(A)(l)-(2)(1994) 
Utah Admin. R. 432-152-5(5.103(F)(4)(1994) 
Utah Admin. R. 432-152-5(5.103(F)(5)(1994) 
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Utah Admin. R. 432-152-5(5.103(F)(6)(1994) 
Utah Admin. R. 432-152-5(5.106)(A)(1994) 
Utah Admin. R. 432-152-5(5.106)(B)(1994) 
Utah Admin. R. 432-152-5(5.201)(A)(l)(1994) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Darlene Collins brought this action in February, 1996 (R. 2), on behalf of her 
daughter Vickie Collins, alleging that the Utah State Developmental Center was negligent 
in allowing Vickie, an adult woman with profound mental retardation, schizophrenia 
(Aplt. App. 7) and a history of seizures (Aplt. App. 9), to use a standard playground 
swing without adequate safety devices (R. 2-5). Plaintiff also alleged that defendant was 
negligent in failing to properly supervise Vickie and in failing to train employees on how 
to care for Vickie (R. 2-5). 
B. Course of the Proceedings and Disposition Below 
1. District Court 
The case proceeded to jury trial beginning on May 12, 1998. Prior to trial, 
defendants filed a motion in limine (R. 64-66), with a supporting memorandum (R. 67-
75), seeking to exclude plaintiffs designated expert witness, Lewis Mustard, from 
testifying on the standard of care owed to Vickie by her health care providers at the Utah 
State Developmental Center. Plaintiff filed a cross-motion (R. 79-80) and memorandum 
3 
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(R. 81-112) which, among other things, opposed exclusion of Mustard as an expert 
witness (R. 82-84). 
After defendants conducted voir dire of Mustard during trial, the district court 
judge preliminarily sustained defendants' objections to Mustard's qualifications (Tr. 15), 
but agreed to give plaintiff an opportunity to establish additional qualifying foundation 
later in the day (Tr. 22-24). Plaintiffs attempt was unsuccessful, and the trial court ruled 
that Mustard was not qualified to opine regarding alleged negligence on the part of the 
defendants and the objection to his testimony was sustained (Tr. 274-295). At the close 
of plaintiff s case-in-chief, the court reconvened while the jury was in recess, and 
defendants moved for a directed verdict on the basis that plaintiff could not establish a 
prima facie case on the standard of care in the absence of expert testimony. Defendants' 
motion was orally granted from the bench (Tr. 330-37) and later reduced to writing (R. 
166-71 and attached as Addendum B). An appeal followed (R. 193-94). 
2. Court of Appeals 
On appeal, plaintiff argued that the district court erred in requiring expert 
testimony on the standard of care applicable to the Developmental Center and, in the 
alternative, that the district court erred in excluding Mustard as an expert witness on the 
applicable standard of care. 
Plaintiff did not argue that the Center was negligent in allowing Vickie to swing 
(Collins v. USDC. 1999 UT App 336, 19, 382 Utah Adv. Rep. 21). Plaintiff conceded 
4 
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that the formulation of Vickie's Individual Habilitation Plan, including recommendations 
for recreational activities, may have required expert testimony to establish the standard of 
care (id.). Plaintiffs only contention on appeal was that the Developmental Center "was 
negligent in failing to take the necessary safety precautions" for Vickie to swing (id.). 
The Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court erred in granting a directed verdict 
because the standard of care in this action could be readily understood by lay jurors, 
thereby eliminating the need for expert testimony. Collins v. USDC, 1999 UT App 336, 
f 6, 382 Utah Adv. Rep. 21. The Court of Appeals declined to reach the issue of whether 
the trial court abused its discretion in not allowing Dr. Mustard's proposed testimony. Id. 
at If 12. 
C. Statement of Facts 
When the events forming the basis of this lawsuit took place in 1994, Vickie 
Collins was a 40-year-old resident of the Utah State Developmental Center, having 
resided there on a full-time basis since 1966 (Aplt. App. 7; Collins v. USDC 1999 UT 
App 336, f 2). Vickie had a dual diagnosis of severe mental retardation and 
schizophrenia (Aplt. App. 7; Collins at f 2). She also had a history of sporadic seizure 
activity (Aplt. App. 17; Collins at f 2). 
Residents at the Developmental Center, including Vickie, were allowed to choose 
their own recreational activities within a range of options provided by the Center (Tr. 
239-240). The Developmental Center took into account each resident's individual needs 
5 
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and disabilities in determining their choice of activities (Tr. 240). Any limitations on the 
activities of seizure patients depended on the nature of that resident's seizures (Tr. 242). 
Swinging had always been one of Vickie's favorite activities from the time she was a little 
girl (Tr. 143-44). She would usually choose to swing over any other options that were 
available to her (Tr. 261). She had been using the swings at the Developmental Center 
without incident since she was a young girl (Tr. 253; 260). 
At the time of the accident, Vickie was wearing a protective helmet which staff 
required her to wear after she sustained head injuries when she fell during a seizure on 
December 9, 1993, and hit her head on a filing cabinet (Aplt. Brf. at 15, f^ 20 and Collins 
at I 3). 
On March 9, 1994, Vickie and seven other residents of the Raintree building were 
taken outside for recreational activities under the supervision of two staff members. 
(Collins at Tf 4). Vickie, wearing her helmet, immediately went to the swings and began 
swinging (Aplt. Brf. at 18, Tflf 32-33; Tr. 246-47 and Collins at % 4). A staff member 
testified that she was within 10 to 15 feet of Vickie, with Vickie in her peripheral vision, 
while kicking a ball to another resident (Tr. 253-54 and Collins at f 4). Within three or 
four minutes, the staff member heard a thump and saw Vickie lying on the ground (Tr. 
248). As a result of the fall, Vickie sustained a high-impact burst of the T-7 vertebra 
which rendered her a paraplegic (Tr. 165-66 and Collins at Tf 4). 
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Decisions about Vickie's care and activities at the Developmental Center were 
made by an interdisciplinary team of professionals including a qualified mental 
retardation professional (QMRP), a social worker, a nurse, a recreational therapist, and 
direct care staff (Tr. 290-91 and Collins at Tf 2). Each year, the treatment team conducted 
a staffing and completed a comprehensive individual habilitation plan (IHP) reviewing all 
facets of Vickie's institutional care and establishing treatment objectives and plans for her 
medical, recreational, social, dietary, and other needs (Aplt. App. 7-20; Tr. 130-34 and 
Collins at f 2). 
The Developmental Center is an Intermediate Care Facility for the Mentally 
Retarded (ICF/MR) (Collins at 12) and is regulated by the State of Utah. Each ICF/MR 
is required to appoint, in writing, an administrator professionally licensed by the Utah 
Department of Commerce as a nursing home administrator (Utah Admin. R. 432-152-
4(4.401(A)( 1994)). Each facility is required to develop and implement policies and 
procedures which "promote the growth, development and independence of the client" 
(Utah Admin. R. 432-152-5(5.201)(A)(l)(1994)). State regulation further requires that 
"[e]ach client shall have an individual program plan developed by an interdisciplinary 
team that represents the professions, disciplines or service areas that are relevant to: (1) 
identifying the client's needs . . . [and] (2) designing programs that meet the client's needs 
(Utah Admin. R. 432-152-5(5.103(A)(1)-(2)(1994)). The individual program plan is 
required to "identify mechanical supports, if needed, to achieve proper body position, 
7 
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balance, or alignment. The plan shall specify the reason for each support, the situations in 
which each is to be applied, and a schedule for the use of each support" (Utah Admin. R. 
432-152-5(5.103)(F)(4)(1994)). The plan is also required to "provide that clients who 
have multiple disabling conditions spend a major portion of each waking day out of bed 
and outside the bedroom area, moving about by various methods and devices whenever 
possible" (Utah Admin. R. 432-152-5(5.103)(F)(5)(1994)) and is also required to "include 
opportunities for client choice and self-management" (Utah Admin. R. 432-152-
5(5.103)(F)(6)(1994)). The plan must be reviewed by a qualified mental retardation 
professional (Utah Admin. R. 432-152-5(5.106)(A)( 1994)) and must be reviewed by the 
interdisciplinary team at least annually (Utah Admin. R. 432-152(5.106)(B)(1994)). 
State regulation requires that "[e]ach client's active treatment program shall be 
integrated, coordinated and monitored by a qualified mental retardation professional." 
(Utah Admin. R. 432-152-4(4.701)(A)(1994)). To qualify as a QMRP, a person must 
have at least one year of experience working directly with persons with mental retardation 
or other developmental disabilities, and must be a doctor of medicine or osteopathy, a 
registered nurse, or must have a bachelor's degree and be qualified as an occupational 
therapist, occupational therapy assistant, physical therapist, physical therapy assistant, 
psychologist, social worker, speech-language pathologist or audiologist, professional 
recreation staff member, professional dietitian, or a human services professional (Utah 
Admin. R. 432-152-4(4.701)(B)( 1994)). 
8 
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In this case, Vickie had a current program plan, also known as an Individual 
Habilitation Plan (IHP), which had been adopted on September 17, 1993 by an 
interdisciplinary team including a qualified mental retardation professional, a psychology 
assistant, a recreational therapist, and a social worker (Aplt. App. 7-20). Vickie's dentist, 
medical doctor, dietitian, and audiologist submitted evaluations, but did not attend the 
interdisciplinary team meeting (kl at 19). Vickie's mother and sister attended the team 
meeting and approved the plan (Aplt. App. 19). One of the competencies/strengths 
specifically identified in the plan was that Vickie "can swing and use play ground 
equipment" (Aplt. App. 11). 
ARGUMENT 
THE COURT OF APPEALS'DECISION IN THIS CASE 
IS IN CONFLICT WITH PRIOR DECISIONS BY THIS 
COURT AND THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The issue before the Court of Appeals was whether the Developmental Center was 
negligent in failing to take the necessary safety precautions for Vickie to swing (Collins at 
Tf 2). The Court of Appeals determined that the standard of care in this action could be 
readily understood by lay jurors, thereby eliminating the need for expert testimony. This 
decision is in conflict with prior case law out of this Court and the Court of Appeals. 
A. THE DEVELOPMENTAL CENTER IS A HIGHLY REGULATED 
HEALTH CARE PROVIDER 
The Developmental Center is a highly regulated Intermediate Care Facility for the 
Mentally Retarded. It is required to have a licensed nursing home administrator as its 
9 
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director (Utah Admin. R. 432-152-4(4.401(A)). The Developmental Center is required to 
"promote the growth, development and independence of each client (Utah Admin. R. 432-
152-5(5.201)(A)(1)). Each resident at the Center must have a plan developed by an 
interdisciplinary team of professionals (Utah Admin. R. 432-152-5(5.103)(A)(l)-(2)) 
which accommodates each resident's needs, keeps them moving about by various 
methods, and includes opportunities for client choice and self-management (Utah Admin. 
R. 432-152-5(5.103)(F)(5)-(6)). If any mechanical supports are to be used, they must be 
identified in the plan with a justification for their use and an explanation as to when they 
are to be used (Utah Admin. R. 432-152-5(5.103)(F)(4)). In addition, each resident's plan 
must be integrated, coordinated and monitored by a qualified mental retardation 
professional (Utah Admin. R. 432-152-4(4.701)(A)). The QMRP must have experience 
working with the developmentally disabled or the mentally retarded. The QMRP must 
have at least a bachelor's degree and maintain a license as a physician, registered nurse, 
occupational therapist or assistant, physical therapist or assistant, psychologist, social 
worker, speech-language pathologist or audiologist, professional recreation staff member, 
or otherwise qualify as a dietitian, or a human services professional (Utah Admin. R. 432-
152-4(4.701)(B)( 1994)). 
Prior to filing this action, plaintiff complied with the Utah Healthcare Malpractice 
Act (Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-1, et seq.) which requires compliance with its terms prior to 
filing a malpractice action against a health care provider. "Health care provider" is 
10 
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defined under the act to include physicians, registered nurses, physical therapist, 
psychologist, audiologist, speech-language pathologist, social worker, social service 
worker, or others rendering similar care and services (Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-3(11)). 
Prior to her accident, an interdisciplinary team including a QMRP, a psychology 
assistant, a recreational therapist and a social worker with input from Vickie?s dentist, 
physician, dietitian, and audiologist, created an individual habilitation plan to address 
Vickie's specific needs (Aplt. App. 7-20). The QMRP and the interdisciplinary team 
charged with managing Vickie's care and treatment at the Developmental Center clearly 
meet the definition of health care providers under the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act. 
B. EXPERT TESTIMONY IS REQUIRED TO ESTABLISH THE 
APPLICABLE STANDARD OF CARE IF THE PROPRIETY OF A 
DEFENDANT'S ACTIONS IS NOT WITHIN THE COMMON 
KNOWLEDGE AND EXPERIENCE OF A LAY PERSON 
Plaintiff has already conceded that the formulation of Vickie's plan, "including the 
recommendation for recreational activities, was specialized in nature and may have 
required expert testimony to determine the standard of care owed to her in making those 
recommendations." Collins at f^ 9. However, no attempt was made by plaintiff or by the 
Court of Appeals to explain how the teamfs determination, or lack thereof, that allowed 
Vickie to use a standard playground swing without additional safety precautions fell 
within the realm of knowledge of a lay person. 
This Court held in Nixdorf v. Hicken. 612 P.2d 348, 352 (Utah 1980) that in a 
majority of medical malpractice actions, the plaintiff must establish the applicable 
11 
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standard of care and a breach of that standard of care through expert testimony. The 
Nixdorf court recognized an exception to this general rule when "the propriety of the 
treatment received is within the common knowledge and experience of the layman.1' Id. 
The Court of Appeals has also held that expert testimony must be provided in 
medical malpractice cases to establish the standard of care, defendant's failure to comply 
with that standard, and that defendant caused plaintiffs injuries. See Hoopiiaina v. IHC. 
740 P.2d 270, 271 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). The Hoopiiaina court also found that "issues of 
fact which are outside the knowledge and experience of lay persons must be established 
by expert testimony." Id. 
Even if this Court determines that the action of the QMRP and the interdisciplinary 
team in failing to require additional safety precautions in order for Vickie to swing was 
not health care, expert testimony was still required on the standard of care. 
This Court extended the application of the general rule requiring expert testimony 
to non-medical cases in Wessel v. Erickson Landscaping Co., 711 P.2d 250 (Utah 1985). 
This Court ruled in Wessel that "[o]rdinarily, the standard of care in a trade or profession 
must be determined by testimony of witnesses in the same trade or profession." Id at 
253. In Wessel plaintiff claimed that defendant had negligently landscaped his yard, 
causing the retaining walls to collapse, sending a substantial portion of his yard into the 
street. This Court ruled that the trial court improperly excluded the testimony of a 
structural engineer on the standard of care owed by a landscape architect. 
12 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The Court of Appeals has also required expert testimony to establish the applicable 
standard of care in non-medical cases. The Court of Appeals ruled in Schreiter v. 
Wasatch Manor, Inc., 871 P.2d 570 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)(duty of high-rise retirement 
home to install sprinkler system) that expert testimony is "needed f[w]here the average 
person has little understanding of the duties owed by particular trades or professions,1 as 
in cases involving medical doctors, architects, and engineers." Schreiter at 574, quoting 
Wvcalis v. Guardian Title, 780 P.2d 821, 826 n. 8 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), cert denied, 789 
P.2d 33 (Utah 1990). The Court adopted the Nixdorf exception to the general rule and 
concluded that "[w]here the propriety of the defendant's action fis within the common 
knowledge and experience of the layman . . . the guidance provided by expert testimony is 
unnecessary.1" Schreiter at 574, quoting Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348, 352 (Utah 
1980)(ellipses in original). See also Ortiz v. Geneva Rock Product, Inc., 939 P.2d 1213 
(Utah Ct. App. 1997)(construction worker injured when he was hit by chute of truck that 
was pouring concrete) and Preston & Chambers, P.C. v. Koller, 943 P.2d 260 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1997)(legal malpractice claim). 
C. DEFENDANTS1 ACTIONS IN THIS CASE WERE NOT WITHIN THE 
COMMON KNOWLEDGE AND EXPERIENCE OF A LAY PERSON 
The issue on appeal, as presented by plaintiff, was whether the Developmental 
Center "was negligent in failing to take the necessary safety precautions11 for Vickie to 
use a swing. The Court of Appeals concluded in this case that plaintiffs action against 
the Developmental Center "did not call into question ?the conduct of a professional in his 
13 
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area of expertise.1" Collins at f^ 10 quoting Moore v. Louis Smith Mem'l Hosp., Inc., 454 
S.E.2d 190, 192 (Ga.Ct.App. 1995). The Court of Appeals decision goes on to conclude 
that expert testimony was not required in this case because "[m]ost jurors could easily 
ascertain the standard of care owed to a three-year-old when supervising her on a swing. 
Similarly, they would understand the standard of care owed to a person with Collins's 
capacities." Collins atf 10. 
This conclusion makes the assumption, without any supporting analysis, that the 
developmentally disabled and the mentally retarded are comparable to children and that a 
lay jury can apply the same standard of care to both. This analysis fails to acknowledge 
the involvement of the interdisciplinary team, headed by a qualified mental retardation 
professional, which is responsible for directing every aspect of Vickie's care and 
treatment at the Developmental Center. The Court's decision fails to explain how a lay 
jury has experience with regulating the daily activities of a severely retarded adult with a 
mental illness and a seizure disorder while providing opportunities for "client choice and 
self-management" (Utah Admin. R. 432-152-5(5.103(F)(4)-(6)) and promoting "growth, 
development and independence of the client (Utah Admin. R. 432-152-5(5.201)(A)(1)). 
In the only other case involving the standard of care applicable to an intermediate 
care facility for the mentally retarded that defendants could locate, the Court of Appeals 
of Tennessee concluded in an unpublished opinion, Reasons v. State of Tennessee, 1987 
WL 16560 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987)(attached at Addendum E), that expert testimony was 
14 
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required to establish the standard of care applicable to a resident's dietary needs. In 
Reasons, the plaintiff, a resident at a state-run intermediate care facility for the mentally 
retarded, was a mentally retarded man who choked on a chicken bone after grabbing food 
from another resident's plate. As in the present case, an interdisciplinary team at the 
Center developed an individual habilitation plan for each resident which included the 
ascertainment and establishment of each resident's dietary needs. The Assistant 
Superintendent for the Center "testified that it was a basic underlying policy at the Center, 
mandated by applicable federal guidelines, that to the greatest extent possible, residents at 
the Center were to be 'normalized.'" Id. at 3. He further explained that residents "were 
entitled to the 'dignity of risk,' that in order to allow mentally retarded patients to develop 
to their fullest capacity, they should be permitted to run the risks of danger or harm in 
progressing up the ladder of development." IcL The Court of Appeals of Tennessee 
concluded that "a resident's dietary needs under these circumstances are something 
outside the scope of common knowledge of a layman and require a professional 
determination." Id. at 3. 
Likewise, in the present case, Vickie's recreational needs were determined by an 
interdisciplinary team of professionals. The decision regarding what safety precautions 
were necessary, if any, for a 40-year-old severely retarded woman with schizophrenia and 
a seizure disorder who had been swinging on regular playground swings all of her life 
when balanced against the requirement to "include opportunities for client choice and 
15 
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self-management" (Utah Admin. R. 432-152-5(5.103)(F)(6)) and promote her "growth, 
development and independence" (Utah Admin. R. 432-152-5(5.201)(A)(1)) is outside the 
scope of common knowledge of a lay person and requires expert testimony. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court of Appeals erred in determining that the conduct of defendants in this 
case was within the knowledge of a lay person and did not require expert testimony to 
establish the applicable standard of care. Defendants respectfully request that this Court 
grant its Petition for Certiorari and review the decision of the Court of Appeals. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 19th day of January, 2000. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
£ BARBARA E. OCHOA 
STEVEN A. COMBE 
Assistant Attorneys General 
Attorneys for Petitioners/Defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that I mailed two true and correct copies of the foregoing PETITION FOR 
A WRIT OF CERTIORARI, postage prepaid, this 19th day of January, 2000, to the 
following: 
Brian S. King 
Richard R. Burke 
KING & ISAACSON 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Respondent 
4 Triad Center, Suite 825 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180 
j A / l 
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This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
—00O00— 
Darlene Collins, 
as guardian of Vickie L. Collins, 
an incompetent person, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Utah State Developmental Center, 
Utah State Department of Human Services, 
and the State of Utah, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
OPINION 
(For Official Publication) 
CaseNo.981511-CA 
F I L E D 
November 18,1999 
1999 UTApp 336 
Third District, Salt Lake Department 
The Honorable J. Dennis Frederick 
Attorneys: 
Brian S. King and Richard R. Burke, Salt Lake City, for Appellant 
Jan Graham and Nancy L. Kemp, Salt Lake City, for Appellees 
Before Judges Bench, Jackson, and Orme. 
BENCH, Judge: 
m I 
. Darlene Collins, mother of Vickie Collins, appeals the trial court's directed verdict in favor of the Utah State 
Developmental Center (Center), which was based on her failure to present competent expert testimony in 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
support of her negligence action against the Center. We reverse. 
BACKGROUND 
112. 
The underlying facts in this case are undisputed. When the events forming the basis of this lawsuit took place, 
Vickie Collins was a forty-year-old resident of the Center, an intermediate care facility for the mentally retarded. 
Throughout her life, Collins has suffered from severe mental retardation, multiple types of seizures, and 
schizophrenia. The Center had a limited guardianship over Collins to provide for her care. Decisions about her 
care were made by a team of professionals, including a qualified mental retardation professional, a social 
worker, a nurse, a recreational therapist, and direct care staff. Each year, the treatment team developed an 
Individual Habitation Plan (IHP) for Collins, which provided specific treatment objectives and plans for her 
medical, recreational, social, dietary, and other needs. 
IP. 
Collins's seizure activity increased significantly in 1993, which was noted in her IHP. The Center did not 
thereafter reevaluate Collins's recreational activities, but did place her in a protective helmet. On March 9, 
1994, while wearing her helmet, Collins joined seven other residents outside to play under the supervision of 
two staff members. She immediately went to the swings and began swinging. A staff member was within ten to 
fifteen feet of Collins when she fell from the swing and was seriously injured. She is now a paraplegic. 
114. 
Collins, through her mother, filed this negligence action against the Center under the Utah Health Care 
Malpractice Act, presumably because the Center is a health care provider covered by the Act. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-14-3(11) (Supp. 1999). The Center filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude the testimony of 
Collins's designated expert witness, Dr. Lewis Mustard, who was prepared to testify regarding the standard of 
care owed to Collins and a breach of that standard by the Center. Dr. Mustard holds a Ph.D. in Health 
Administration, has taught numerous courses and seminars in health care management and administration, 
and has twenty-five years of experience in hospital administration. At trial, the court preliminarily sustained the 
Center's objection to Dr. Mustard's proposed testimony, but agreed to give Collins further opportunity to qualify 
Dr. Mustard as an expert later in the day. Collins's later attempt to qualify Dr. Mustard was unsuccessful. At the 
close of Collins's case-in-chief, the Center moved for a directed verdict arguing that, given the absence of 
expert testimony, Collins did not establish the applicable standard of care and a breach thereof. The court 
agreed, concluding that the case required expert testimony, and granted the Center's motion for a directed 
verdict. This appeal followed. 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
U5. 
The sole issue presented in this appeal is whether the trial court properly granted a directed verdict in favor of 
the Center. In reviewing a directed verdict, "'[w]e must examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
losing party, and if there is a reasonable basis in the evidence and in the inferences to be drawn therefrom that 
would support a judgment in favor of the losing party, the directed verdict cannot be sustained.'" Virginia S. v. 
Salt Lake Care Ctr.. 741 P.2d 969, 971 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (quoting Management Comm. of Graystone Pines 
Homeowners Ass'n v. Graystone Pines. Inc.. 652 P.2d 896, 898 (Utah 1982)). A directed verdict is only 
"appropriate if, on uncontested facts and under the applicable law, one party is entitled to judgment." Brehany 
v. Nordstrom, Inc., 812 P.2d 49, 57 (Utah 1991). 
ANALYSIS 
116. 
Collins first argues that the trial court erred in granting a directed verdict because the standard of care in this 
action could be readily understood by lay jurors, thereby eliminating the need for expert testimony. We agree. 
117. 
"In medical malpractice cases, expert testimony is generally required to establish the standard of care 
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'because the nature of the profession removes the particularities of its practice from the knowledge and 
understanding of the average citizen."' Virginia S.. 741 P.2d at 971 (quoting Nixdorfv. Hicken. 612 P.2d 348, 
352 (Utah 1980)). However, "expert testimony is unnecessary to establish the standard of care owed the 
plaintiff where the propriety of the treatment received is within the common knowledge and experience of the 
layman." Nixdorf, 612 P.2d at 352. 
118. 
This case falls within the Nixdorf "common-knowledge" exception because "there are no medical technicalities 
involved that call for expert testimony to determine whether the [Center] breached its standard of care." Virginia 
SL 741 P.2d at 972. Virginia S. involved the rape of a seventeen-year-old girl, incapable of consenting to sex, 
while under the care and custody of the Salt Lake Care Center. See id. at 970. She suffered from neuro-
degenerative disease, severe mental retardation, progressive dementia, seizures, muscle weakness, and 
failing eyesight and hearing. See id. This court concluded that expert testimony was unnecessary because the 
standard of care owed to Virginia S. to protect her from rape falls within the common-knowledge exception. 
See id. at 972. Likewise, a lay juror can readily evaluate the alleged negligence by the Center in failing to 
protect Collins from a swing injury. 
H9. 
Collins does not dispute that the Center's formulation of her IHP, including recommendations for recreational 
activities, was special in nature and may have required expert testimony to determine the standard of care 
owed to her in making those recommendations. But the formulation of the IHP is not at issue here. Collins also 
does not argue that the Center was negligent in allowing her to swing. Rather, Collins simply contends that the 
Center was negligent in failing to take the necessary safety precautions for this very common recreational 
activity. Although Collins filed her claim under the Malpractice Act, it is clear from the following relevant 
allegations in Collins's original complaint that her case was one of simple negligence: 
14. The defendants' employees were negligent in placing [Collins] on a swing which did not 
contain adequate safety devices to keep [Collins] from falling from it. The employees were aware 
of [Collins's] mental and physical limitations and knew of the seizures she has suffered from in 
the recent past yet the defendants' employees failed to take proper precautions to ensure 
[Collins's] safety. 
15. The defendants' employees were negligent in failing to utilize the swings available at the 
Developmental Center specifically made to provide adequate support to handicapped individuals. 
16. The defendants' employees were negligent in failing to adequately supervise [Collins] as she 
was swinging on or about March 9,1994. 
17. The defendants were negligent in failing to adequately staff the facility to provide adequate 
supervision of [Collins] and in failing to train employees on how to care for [Collins]. 
See Moore v. Louis Smith Mem'l Hosp., Inc.. 454 S.E.2d 190, 192 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995) (providing that court 
must look to substance of action against health care facility to determine whether action is for professional or 
simple negligence). The plaintiff in Moore was injured when a nursing assistant moved her from a wheelchair 
to a bed, and her foot became caught in the bed rail. See id. at 191. The court found that the injury involved 
simple negligence, "rather than an act requiring the exercise of expert medical judgment." JdL at 192. The 
decision regarding when and how a patient should be transported may require expert medical judgment. 
However, the actual "'safe movement of [plaintiff] from the [wheelchair to the bed] was merely an act of relative 
physical strength and dexterity.'" jd. (citation omitted, alterations in original). 
1110. 
Likewise, Collins's action against the Center did not call into question '"the conduct of a professional in his area 
of expertise."' \jL (citation omitted). The record does not show, and the Center does not suggest, that the 
implementation of the decision to allow Collins to swing had "to be performed by a person with medical training 
or that it involved the exercise of medical judgment or required medical expertise." kL Most jurors could easily 
ascertain the standard of care owed to a three-year-old when supervising her on a swing. Similarly, they would 
understand the standard of care owed to a person with Collins's capacities. Simply put, the duty the Center 
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owed to Collins, and its alleged breach, required no expert testimony. 
mi. 
Collins therefore did not need expert testimony to establish the appropriate standard of care and any breach 
thereof. "In this type of situation, the plaintiff can rely on the common knowledge and understanding of laymen 
to establish this element." Nixdorf. 612 P.2d at 353. Thus, under the applicable law, the Center was not entitled 
to a directed verdict in its favor. SeeWycalis v. Guardian Title of Utah, 780 P.2d 821, 825 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) 
(stating that m[o]rdinarily, whether a defendant has breached the required standard of care is a question of fact 
for the jury'") (citation omitted). 
U12. 
Having determined that the trial court erred in requiring expert testimony, we need not reach the issue of 
whether the trial court abused its discretion in not allowing Dr. Mustard's proposed testimony. 
CONCLUSION 
1113. 
The trial court erred in entering a directed verdict based on Collins's inability to present competent expert 
testimony because expert testimony was unnecessary. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a new trial. 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
1J14. 
WE CONCUR: 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DARLENE COLLINS, as guardian 
of VICKIE COLLINS, an 
incompetent person, : ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
UTAH STATE DEVELOPMENTAL 
CENTER, and the UTAH STATE 
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES 
and the STATE OF UTAH, 
Defendants. 
This matter came before the Court for jury trial commencing 
May 12, 1998. Plaintiff was represented by counsel, Brian S. 
King, Richard R. Burke and Butch L. Johnson. Defendants were 
represented by counsel, Barbara E. Ochoa and Steven A. Combe. At 
' f t !* . 0 . , S T W CT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
Civil No. 960901154 CV 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
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f 
the conclusion of plaintiff's evidence, and after she had rested, 
defendants moved the Court for a directed verdict pursuant to 
Rule 50(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court, having -^  
heard the plaintiff's evidence and the argument of counsel, ruled 
from the bench as follows: 
A directed verdict is appropriate under Rule 50(a), Utah
 :: 
Rules of Civil Procedure, when the court concludes that 
reasonable minds would not differ on the facts to be determined 
from the evidence presented. 
While this case does not present the classic medical 
malpractice claim, it does include the provision of health care 
services of the type beyond the scope of knowledge of a lay 
juror. As a result, expert testimony is required on the standard 
of care applicable at an intermediate care facility for the 
mentally retarded under the circumstances of this case. Expert 
testimony is also required to establish a breach of that standard 
of care. Without such expert testimony, plaintiff is unable to 
establish two of the elements of her prima facie case. 
2 
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Plaintiff's proposed expert witness on the standard of care, 
Lewis Mustard, Ph.D., was not allowed to testify regarding his 
opinions in this case because he did not have the requisite 
qualifications. While he was eminently qualified in hospital 
management, he had no formal education or schooling in patient 
care, his prior work experience was primarily in institutions 
which did not deal with the developmentally disabled or mentally 
retarded, he has never rendered treatment to the mentally 
disabled, he has not made decisions related to safety and 
recreation for the developmentally disabled, and he is not 
familiar with the standard of care at any other intermediate care 
facility for the mentally retarded, including the use of 
recreational equipment at the facilities. Dr. Mustard is not a 
qualified mental retardation professional, he is not a licensed 
professional in any field, he could not recall the last time he 
observed an intermediate care facility for the mentally retarded 
and he had not reviewed policies for other intermediate care 
facilities for the mentally retarded, nor was he familiar with 
the practice at other intermediate care facilities for the 
3 
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( ( 
mentally retarded regarding the use of recreational equipment by 
individuals with conditions similar to those of Vickie Collins. 
The application of risk management principles is distinct from 
the relevant issues in this case. As a result of all of the 
foregoing, the Court ruled that Dr. Mustard was not qualified to 
opine on the alleged negligence of the Utah State Developmental 
Center. 
Without the testimony of an expert witness on the issues of 
standard of care and breach of the standard of care, plaintiff 
has failed to establish two of the requisite elements of her 
claim and her case fails as a matter of law. 
Based upon all of the foregoing, the Court now enters the 
following Order: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that defendants' 
motion for directed verdict is granted and a verdict is hereby 
rendered in favor of defendants. Judgment is entered in favor of 
defendants and against plaintiff for defendants' costs of action 
in this matter in the amount of $ . 
4 
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DATED this 
Approved as to form: 
• * 
/ 
day of , 1998. 
BRIAN S. KING 
RICHARD R. BURKE 
BUTCH L. JOHNSON 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This is to certify that I sent via facsimile and mailed a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT, postage prepaid, this /& day 
of July, 1998, to the following: 
Brian S. King 
Butch L. Johnson 
Richard R. Burke 
KING & ISAACSON 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
4 Triad Center, Suite 825 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180 
rfr^^ 
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CALENDARED 
Qn\ 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
DARLENE COLLINS, as guardian : 




UTAH STATE DEVELOPMENTAL 
CENTER, and the UTAH STATE 
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES 
and the STATE OF UTAH, 
Defendants/Appellees. 
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS1 EX PARTE MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME 
IN WHICH TO FILE A PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
Defendants1 Ex Parte Motion for Extension of Time in which 
to File a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari came before the Utah 
Supreme Court on December 20, 1999. 
The original time for filing a petition for a writ of 
certiorari had not yet expired and good cause appears for 
granting the requested 3 0-day extension. Therefore, the 
following order is hereby entered: 
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that defendants are 
granted an additional thirty days, up to and including January 
OEC20W8 
Air gs®®^ 
Court of Appeals 
Case No. 981511-CA 
District Court 
Case No. 960901154 CV 
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19, 2000, in which to file a petition for writ of certiorari. 
1999. DATED this day of (ci-OLA^KshiA-*? 
W^b ^ / ^ ^ e ^ f c r ^ 
CLERK OF THE COURT 
UTAH SUPREME COURT 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
This is to certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' EX PARTE MOTION FOR EXTENSION 
OF TIME IN WHICH TO FILE A PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI, 
postage prepaid, this && day of {^Uhlw^, 1999, to the 
following: 
Brian S. King 
Richard R. Burke 
KING & ISAACSON 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
4 Triad Center, Suite 825 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180 
^ <£1&J^ 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on December 21,1999, a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was 
deposited in the United States mail to the party(ies) listed below: 
BRIAN S. KING 
RICHARD R. BURKE 
KING & ISAACSON 
4 TRIAD CTR STE 825 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84180 
NANCY L. KEMP 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
160E300S6THFLR 
PO BOX 140856 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0856 
and a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was hand delivered to a personal 
representative of the court(s) listed below: 
THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE 
ATTN: SUZY CARLSON 
450 S STATE ST 
PO BOX 1860 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-1860 
JULIA D'ALESANDRO 
COURT OF APPEALS 
450 S STATE ST 
PO BOX 140230 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0230 
Deputy Clerk 
CaseNo.981511-SC 
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78-13-6 JUDICIAL CODE 562 
county where any defendant in such action resides; and if any 
such defendant is a corporation, the county in which such 
corporation has an office or place of business shall be deemed 
the county in which such corporation resides, within the 
meaning of this section. 1995 
78-13-6. Aris ing without this state in favor of resident. 
All transitory causes of action arising without this state in 
favor of residents of this state shall, if action is brought 
thereon in this state, be brought and tried in the county where 
the plaintiff resides, or in the county where the principal 
defendant resides, or if the principal defendant is a corpora-
tion, then in the county where the plaintiff resides or in the 
county where such corporation has an office or place of 
business, subject, however, to a change of venue as provided by 
law. 1953 
78-13-7. All other actions. 
In all other cases the action must be tried in the county in 
which the cause of action arises, or in the county in which any 
defendant resides at the commencement of the action; pro-
vided, that if any such defendant is a corporation, any county 
in which such corporation has its principal office or place of 
business shall be deemed the county in which such corporation 
resides within the meaning of this section. If none of the 
defendants resides in this state, such action may be com-
menced and tried in any county which the plaintiff may 
designate in his complaint; and if the defendant is about to 
depart from the state, such action may be tried in any county 
where any of the parties resides or service is had, subject, 
however, to the power of the court to change the place of trial 
as provided by law. 1953 
78-13-8. Change of venue — Conditions precedent . 
If the county in which the action is commenced is not the 
proper county for the trial thereof, the action may neverthe-
less be tried therein, unless the defendant at the time he 
answers or otherwise appears files a motion, in writing, that 
the trial be had in the proper county. 1953 
78-13-9. Grounds. 
The court may, on motion, change the place of trial in the 
following cases: 
(1) when the county designated in the complaint is not 
the proper county; 
(2) when there is reason to believe that an impartial 
trial cannot be had in the county, city, or precinct desig-
nated in the complaint; 
(3) when the convenience of witnesses and the ends of 
justice would be promoted by the change; 
(4) when all the parties to an action, by stipulation or 
by consent in open court entered in the minutes, agree 
that the place of trial may be changed to another county. 
Thereupon the court must order the change as agreed 
upon. 1953 
78-13-10. Court to which transfer is to be made. 
If any action or proceeding is commenced or is pending in a 
court and the court orders the place of trial to be changed, it 
must be transferred for trial to a court the parties may agree 
upon by stipulation in writing or made in open court and 
entered in the minutes, or if they do not so agree, then to the 
nearest court where like objection or cause for making the 
)rder does not exist. 1953 
78-13-11. Duty of clerk — Fees and costs — Effect on 
jurisdiction. 
When an order is made transferring an action or proceeding 
or trial, the court must transmit the pleadings and papers 
herein to the court to which it is transferred. The costs and 
ees therefor and filing the papers anew must be paid by the 
party at whose instance the order was made; provided, that 
when such order is made for the reason that the cause was 
commenced in the wrong county, the costs of transfer and 
filing the papers anew shall be paid by the plaintiff in the 
action within ten days after the making of such order, or said 
cause shall be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. The court to 
which an action or proceeding is transferred shall have and 
exercise the same jurisdiction as if it had been originally 
commenced therein. 1953 
CHAPTER 14 
MALPRACTICE ACTIONS AGAINST HEALTH CARE 
PROVIDERS 
Section 
78-14-1. Short title of act. 
78-14-2. Legislative findings and declarations — Pur-
pose of act. 
78-14-3. Definitions. 
78-14-4. Statute of limitations — Exceptions — Appli-
cation. 
78-14-4.5. Amount of award reduced by amounts of col-
lateral sources available to plaintiff — No 
reduction where subrogation right exists — 
Collateral sources defined — Procedure to 
preserve subrogation rights — Evidence ad-
missible — Exceptions. 
78-14-5. Failure to obtain informed consent — Proof 
required of patient — Defenses — Consent to 
health care. 
78-14-6. Writing required as basis for liability for 
breach of guarantee, warranty, contract or 
assurance of result. 
78-14-7. Ad damnum clause prohibited in complaint. 
78-14-7.1. Limitation of award of noneconomic damages 
in malpractice actions. 
78-14-7.5. Limitation on attorney's contingency fee in 
malpractice action. 
78-14-8. Notice of intent to commence action. 
78-14-9. Professional liability insurance coverage for 
providers — Insurance commissioner may 
require joint underwriting authority. 
78-14-9.5. Periodic payment of future damages in mal-
practice actions. 
78-14-10. Actions under Utah Governmental Immunity 
Act. 
78-14-11. Act not retroactive — Exception. 
78-14-12. Division to provide panel — Exemption — 
Procedures — Statute of limitations tolled — 
Composition of panel — Expenses — Divi-
sion authorized to set license fees. 
78-14-13. Proceedings — Authority of panel — Rights of 
parties to proceedings. 
78-14-14. Decision and recommendations of panel — No 
judicial or other review. 
78-14-15. Evidence of proceedings not admissible in sub-
sequent action — Panelist may not be com-
pelled to testify — Immunity of panelist from 
civil liability — Information regarding pro-
fessional conduct. 
78-14-16. Proceedings considered a binding arbitration 
hearing upon written agreement of parties 
— Compensation to members of panel. 
78-14-17. Arbitration agreements. 
78-14-1. Short t it le of act. 
This act shall be known and may be cited as the "Utah 
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78-14-2. Legislative findings and declarations — Pur-
pose of act. 
The legislature finds and declares that the number of suits 
and claims for damages and the amount of judgments and 
settlements arising from health care has increased greatly in 
recent years. Because of these increases the insurance indus-
try has substantially increased the cost of medical malpractice 
insurance. The effect of increased insurance premiums and 
increased claims is increased health care cost, both through 
the health care providers passing the cost of premiums to the 
patient and through the provider's practicing defensive medi-
cine because he views a patient as a potential adversary in a 
lawsuit. Further, certain health care providers are discour-
aged from continuing to provide services because of the high 
cost and possible unavailability of malpractice insurance. 
In view of these recent trends and with the intention of 
alleviating the adverse effects which these trends are produc-
ing in the public's health care system, it is necessary to protect 
the public interest by enacting measures designed to encour-
age private insurance companies to continue to provide 
health-related malpractice insurance while at the same time 
establishing a mechanism to ensure the availability of insur-
ance in the event that it becomes unavailable from private 
companies. 
In enacting this act, it is the purpose of the legislature to 
provide a reasonable time in which actions may be commenced 
against health care providers while limiting that time to a 
specific period for which professional liability insurance pre-
miums can be reasonably and accurately calculated; and to 
provide other procedural changes to expedite early evaluation 
and settlement of claims. 1976 
78-14-3. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Audiologist" means a person licensed to practice 
audiology under Title 58, Chapter 41, Speech-language 
Pathology and Audiology Licensing Act. 
(2) "Certified social worker" means a person licensed to 
practice as a certified social worker under Section 58-60-
305. 
(3) "Chiropractic physician" means a person licensed to 
practice chiropractic under Title 58, Chapter 73, Chiro-
practic Physician Practice Act. 
(4) "Clinical social worker" means a person licensed to 
practice as a clinical social worker under Section 58-60-
305. 
(5) "Commissioner" means the commissioner of insur-
ance as provided in Section 31A-2-102. 
(6) "Dental hygienist" means a person licensed to prac-
tice dental hygiene as defined in Section 58-69-102. 
(7) "Dentist" means a person licensed to practice den-
tistry as defined in Section 58-69-102. 
(8) "Division" means the Division of Occupational and 
Professional Licensing created in Section 58-1-103. 
(9) "Future damages" includes damages for future 
medical treatment, care or custody, loss of future earn-
ings, loss of bodily function, or future pain and suffering of 
the judgment creditor. 
(10) "Health care" means any act or treatment per-
formed or furnished, or which should have been per-
formed or furnished, by any health care provider for, to, or 
on behalf of a patient during the patient's medical care, 
treatment, or confinement. 
(11) "Health care provider" includes any person, part-
nership, association, corporation, or other facility or insti-
tution who causes to be rendered or who renders health 
care or professional services as a hospital, physician, 
registered nurse, licensed practical nurse, nurse-midwife, 
dentist, dental hygienist, optometrist, clinical laboratory 
technologist, pharmacist, physical therapist, podiatric 
physician, psychologist, chiropractic physician, naturo-
pathic physician, osteopathic physician, osteopathic phy-
sician and surgeon, audiologist, speech-language patholo-
gist, clinical social worker, certified social worker, social 
service worker, marriage and family counselor, practitio-
ner of obstetrics, or others rendering similar care and 
services relating to or arising out of the health needs of 
persons or groups of persons and officers, employees, or 
agents of any of the above acting in the course and scope 
of their employment. 
(12) "Hospital" means a public or private institution 
licensed under Title 26, Chapter 21, Health Care Facility 
Licensing and Inspection Act. 
(13) "Licensed practical nurse" means a person licensed 
to practice as a licensed practical nurse as provided in 
Section 58-31b-301. 
(14) "Malpractice action against a health care pro-
vider" means any action against a health care provider, 
whether in contract, tort, breach of warranty, wrongful 
death, or otherwise, based upon alleged personal injuries 
relating to or arising out of health care rendered or which 
should have been rendered by the health care provider. 
(15) "Marriage ant! ':i:/«ily therapist" means a person 
licensed to practice as a marriage therapist or family 
therapist under Section 58-60-405. 
(16) "Naturopathic physician" means a person licensed 
to practice naturopathy as defined in Section 58-71-102. 
(17) "Nurse-midwife" means a person licensed to en-
gage in practice as a nurse midwife under Section 58-44a-
301. 
(18) "Optometrist" means a person licensed to practice 
optometry under Title 58, Chapter 16a, Utah Optometry 
Practice Act. 
(19) "Osteopathic physician" means a person licensed 
to practice osteopathy under Title 58, Chapter 68, Utah 
Osteopathic Medical Practice Act. 
(20) "Patient" means a person who is under the care of. 
a health care provider, under a contract, express or 
implied. 
(21) "Pharmacist" means a person licensed to practice 
pharmacy as provided in Section 58-17a-301. 
(22) "Physical therapist" means a person licensed to 
practice physical therapy under Title 58, Chapter 24a, 
Physical Therapist Practice Act. 
(23) "Physician" means a person licensed to practice 
medicine and surgery under Title 58, Chapter 67, Utah 
Medical Practice Act. 
(24) "Podiatric physician" means a person licensed to 
practice podiatry under Title 58, Chapter 5a, Podiatric 
Physician Licensing Act. 
(25) "Practitioner of obstetrics" means a person li-
censed to practice as a physician in this state under Title 
58, Chapter 67, Utah Medical Practice Act, or under Title 
58, Chapter 68, Utah Osteopathic Medical Practice Act. 
(26) "Psychologist" means a person licensed under Title 
58, Chapter 61, Psychologist Licensing Act, to practice 
psychology as defined in Section 58-61-102. 
(27) "Registered nurse" means a person licensed to 
practice professional nursing as provided in Section 58-
31b-301. 
(28) "Representative" means the spouse, parent, guard-
ian, trustee, attorney-in-fact, or other legal agent of the 
patient. 
(29) "Social service worker" means a person licensed to 
practice as a social service worker under Section 58-60-
305. 
(30) "Speech-language pathologist" means a person li-
censed to practice speech-language pathology under Title 
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58, Chapter 41, Speech-language Pathology and Audiol-
ogy Licensing Act. 
(31) "Tort" means any legal wrong, breach of duty, or 
negligent or unlawful act or omission proximately causing 
injury or damage to another. 1998 
78-14-4. Statute of l imitat ions — Except ions — Appli-
cation. 
(1) No malpractice action against a health care provider 
may be brought unless it is commenced within two years after 
the plaintiff or patient discovers, or through the use of 
reasonable diligence should have discovered the injury, which-
ever first occurs, but not to exceed four years after the date of 
the alleged act, omission, neglect or occurrence, except that: 
(a) In an action where the allegation against the health 
care provider is that a foreign object has been wrongfully 
left within a patient's body, the claim shall be barred 
unless commenced within one year after the plaintiff or 
patient discovers, or through the use of reasonable dili-
gence should have discovered, the existence of the foreign 
object wrongfully left in the patient's body, whichever first 
occurs; and 
(b) In an action where it is alleged that a patient has 
been prevented from discovering misconduct on the part 
of a health care provider because that health care pro-
vider has affirmatively acted to fraudulently conceal the 
alleged misconduct, the claim shall be barred unless 
commenced within one year after the plaintiff or patient 
discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence, 
should have discovered the fraudulent concealment, 
whichever first occurs. 
(2) The provisions of this section shall apply to all persons, 
regardless of minority or other legal disability under Section 
78-12-36 or any other provision of the law, and shall apply 
retroactively to all persons, partnerships, associations and 
corporations and to all health care providers and to all 
malpractice actions against health care providers based upon 
alleged personal injuries which occurred prior to the effective 
date of this act; provided, however, that any action which 
under former law could have been commenced after the 
effective date of this act may be commenced only within the 
unelapsed portion of time allowed under former law; but any 
action which under former law could have been commenced 
more than four years after the effective date of this act may be 
commenced only within four years after the effective date of 
this act. 1979 
78-14-4.5. Amount of award reduced by amounts of 
collateral sources available to plaintiff — No 
reduct ion where subrogation right exists — 
Collateral sources defined — Procedure to 
preserve subrogation r ights — Evidence ad-
missible — Exceptions. 
(1) In all malpractice actions against health care providers 
as defined in Section 78-14-3 in which damages are awarded to 
compensate the plaintiff for losses sustained, the court shall 
reduce the amount of such award by the total of all amounts 
paid to the plaintiff from all collateral sources which are 
available to him; however, there shall be no reduction for 
collateral sources for which a subrogation right exists as 
provided in this section nor shall there be a reduction for any 
collateral payment not included in the award of damages. 
Upon a finding of liability and an awarding of damages by the 
trier of fact, the court shall receive evidence concerning the 
total amounts of collateral sources which have been paid to or 
for the benefit of the plaintiff or are otherwise available to 
him. The court shall also take testimony of any amount which 
has been paid, contributed, or forfeited by, or on behalf of the 
plaintiff or members of his immediate family to secure his 
right to any collateral source benefit which he is receiving as 
a result of his injury, and shall offset any reduction in the 
award by such amounts. No evidence shall be received and no 
reduction made with respect to future collateral source ben-
efits except as specified in Subsection (4). 
(2) For purposes of this section "collateral source" means 
payments made to or for the benefit of the plaintiff for: 
(a) medical expenses and disability payments payable 
under the United States Social Security Act, any federal, 
state, or local income disability act, or any other public 
program, except the federal programs which are required 
by law to seek subrogation; 
(b) any health, sickness, or income disability insur-
ance, automobile accident insurance that provides health 
benefits or income disability coverage, and any other 
similar insurance benefits, except life insurance benefits 
available to the plaintiff, whether purchased by the plain-
tiff or provided by others; 
(c) any contract or agreement of any person, group, 
organization, partnership, or corporation to provide, pay 
for, or reimburse the costs of hospital, medical, dental, or 
other health care services, except benefits received as 
gifts, contributions, or assistance made gratuitously; and 
(d) any contractual or voluntary wage continuation 
plan provided by employers or any other system intended 
to provide wages during a period of disability. 
(3) To preserve subrogation rights for amounts paid or 
received prior to settlement or judgment, a provider of collat-
eral sources shall serve at least 30 days before settlement or 
trial of the action a written notice upon each health care 
provider against whom the malpractice action has been as-
serted. The written notice shall state the name and address of 
the provider of collateral sources, the amount of collateral 
sources paid, the names and addresses of all persons who 
received payment, and the items and purposes for which 
payment has been made. 
(4) Evidence is admissible of government programs that 
provide payments or benefits available in the future to or for 
the benefit of the plaintiff to the extent available irrespective 
of the recipient's ability to pay. Evidence of the likelihood or 
unlikelihood that such programs, payments, or benefits will be 
available in the future is also admissible. The trier of fact may 
consider such evidence in determining the amount of damages 
awarded to a plaintiff for future expenses. 
(5) No provider of collateral sources is entitled to recover 
the amounts of such benefits from a health care provider, the 
plaintiff, or any other person or entity as reimbursement for 
collateral source payments made prior to settlement or judg-
ment, including any payments made under Title 26, Chapter 
19, except to the extent that subrogation rights to amounts 
paid prior to settlement or judgment are preserved as pro-
vided in this section. All policies of insurance providing 
benefits affected by this section are construed in accordance 
with this section. • 1992 
78-14-5. Failure to obtain informed consent — Proof 
required of patient — Defenses — Consent to 
health care. 
(1) When a person submits to health care rendered by a 
health care provider, it shall be presumed that what the 
health care provider did was either expressly or impliedly 
authorized to be done. For a patient to recover damages from 
a health care provider in an action based upon the provider's 
failure to obtain informed consent, the patient must prove the 
following: 
(a) that a provider-patient relationship existed be-
tween the patient and health care provider; 
(b) the health care provider rendered health care to the 
patient; 
(c) the patient suffered personal injuries arising out of 
the health care rendered; 
(d) the I 
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(d) the health care rendered carried with it a substan-
tial and significant risk of causing the patient serious 
harm; 
(e) the patient was not informed of the substantial and 
significant risk; 
(f) a reasonable, prudent person in the patient's posi-
tion would not have consented to the health care rendered 
after having been fully informed as to all facts relevant to 
the decision to give consent. In determining what a 
reasonable, prudent person in the patient's position would 
do under the circumstances, the finder of fact shall use the 
viewpoint of the patient before health care was provided 
and before the occurrence of any personal injuries alleged 
to have arisen from said health care; and 
(g) the unauthorized part of the health care rendered 
was the proximate cause of personal injuries suffered by 
the patient. 
(2) It shall be a defense to any malpractice action against a 
health care provider based upon alleged failure to obtain 
informed consent if: 
(a) the risk of the serious harm which the patient 
actually suffered was relatively minor; 
(b) the risk of serious harm to the patient from the 
health care provider was commonly known to the public; 
(c) the patient stated, prior to receiving the health care 
complained of, that he would accept the health care 
involved regardless of the risk; or that he did not want to 
be informed of the matters to which he would be entitled 
to be informed; 
(d) the health care provider, after considering all of the 
attendant facts and circumstances, used reasonable dis-
cretion as to the manner and extent to which risks were 
disclosed, if the health care provider reasonably believed 
that additional disclosures could be expected to have a 
substantial and adverse effect on the patient's condition; 
or 
(e) the patient or his representative executed a written 
consent which sets forth the nature and purpose of the 
intended health care and which contains a declaration 
that the patient accepts the risk of substantial and 
serious harm, if any, in hopes of obtaining desired benefi-
cial results of health care and which acknowledges that 
health care providers involved have explained his condi-
tion and the proposed health care in a satisfactory man-
ner and that all questions asked about the health care and 
its attendant risks have been answered in a manner 
satisfactory to the patient or his representative; such 
written consent shall be a defense to an action against a 
health care provider based upon failure to obtain in-
formed consent unless the patient proves that the person 
giving the consent lacked capacity to consent or shows by 
clear and convincing proof that the execution of the 
written consent was induced by the defendant's affirma-
tive acts of fraudulent misrepresentation or fraudulent 
omission to state material facts. 
(3) Nothing contained in this act shall be construed to 
prevent any person 18 years of age or over from refusing to 
consent to health care for his own person upon personal or 
religious grounds. 
(4) The following persons are authorized and empowered to 
consent to any health care not prohibited by law: 
(a) any parent, whether an adult or a minor, for his 
minor child; 
(b) any married person, for a spouse; 
(c) any person temporarily standing in loco parentis, 
whether formally serving or not, for the minor under his 
care and any guardian for his ward; 
(d) any person 18 years of age or over for his or her 
parent who is unable by reason of age, physical or mental 
condition, to provide such consent; 
(e) any patient 18 years of age or over; 
(f) any female regardless of age or marital status, 
when given in connection with her pregnancy or child-
birth; 
(g) in the absence of a parent, any adult for his minor 
brother or sister; and 
(h) in the absence of a parent, any grandparent for his 
minor grandchild. 
(5) No person who in good faith consents or authorizes 
health care t reatment or procedures for another as provided 
by this act shall be subject to civil liability. 1976 
78-14-6. Writing required as basis for liability for 
breach of guarantee, warranty, contract or 
assurance of result. 
No liability shall be imposed upon any health care provider 
on the basis of an alleged breach of guarantee, warranty, 
contract or assurance of result to be obtained from any health 
care rendered unless the guarantee, warranty, contract or 
assurance is set forth in writing and signed by the health care 
provider or an authorized agent of the provider. 1976 
78-14-7. Ad damnum clause prohibited in complaint. 
No dollar amount shall be specified in the prayer of a 
complaint filed in a malpractice action against a health care 
provider. The complaint shall merely pray for such damages as 
are reasonable in the premises. 1976 
78-14-7.1. Limitation of award of noneconomic dam-
ages in malpractice actions. 
In a malpractice action against a health care provider, an 
injured plaintiff may recover noneconomic losses to compen-
sate for pain, suffering, and inconvenience. In no case shall the 
amount of damages awarded for such noneconomic loss exceed 
$250,000. This limitation does not affect awards of punitive 
damages. 1986 
78-14-7.5. Limitation on attorney's contingency fee in 
malpractice action. 
(1) In any malpractice action against a health care provider 
as defined in Section 78-14-3, an attorney shall not collect a 
contingent fee for representing a client seeking damages in 
connection with or arising out of personal injury or wrongful 
death caused by the negligence of another which exceeds 
33V&% of the amount recovered. 
(2) This limitation applies regardless of whether the recov-
ery is by settlement, arbitration, judgment, or whether appeal 
is involved. 1985 
78-14-8. Notice of intent to commence action. 
No malpractice action against a health care provider may be 
initiated unless and until the plaintiff gives the prospective 
defendant or his executor or successor, at least ninety days' 
prior notice of intent to commence an action. Such notice shall 
include a general statement of the nature of the claim, the 
persons involved, the date, time and place of the occurrence, 
the circumstances thereof, specific allegations of misconduct 
on the part of the prospective defendant, the nature of the 
alleged injuries and other damages sustained. Notice may be 
in letter or affidavit form executed by the plaintiff or his 
attorney. Service shall be accomplished by persons authorized 
and in the manner prescribed by the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure for the service of the summons and complaint in a 
civil action or by certified mail, return receipt requested, in 
which case notice shall be deemed to have been served on the 
date of mailing. Such notice shall be served within the time 
allowed for commencing a malpractice action against a health 
care provider. If the notice is served less than ninety days 
prior to the expiration of the applicable time period, the time 
for commencing the malpractice action against the health care 
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provider shall be extended to 120 days from the date of service 
of notice. 
This section shall, for purposes of determining its retroac-
tivity, not be construed as relating to the limitation on the 
time for commencing any action, and shall apply only to 
causes of action arising on or after April 1, 1976. This section 
shall not apply to third party actions, counterclaims or 
crossclaims against a health care provider. 1979 
78-14-9. Professional liability insurance coverage for 
providers — Insurance commissioner may re-
quire joint underwriting authority. 
If the commissioner finds after a hearing that in any part of 
this state any professional liability insurance coverage for 
health care providers is not readily available in the voluntary 
market, and that the public interest requires, he may by 
regulation promulgate and implement plans to provide insur-
ance coverage through all insurers issuing professional liabil-
ity policies and individual and group accident and sickness 
policies providing medical, surgical or hospital expense cover-
age on either a prepaid or an expense incurred basis, including 
personal injury protection and medical expense coverage is-
sued incidental to liability insurance policies. 1976 
78-14-9.5. Periodic payment of future damages in mal-
practice actions. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Future damages" means a judgment creditor's 
damages for future medical treatment, care or custody, 
loss of future earnings, loss of bodily function, or future 
pain and suffering. 
(b) "Periodic payments" means the payment of money 
or delivery of other property to the judgment creditor at 
such intervals as ordered by the court. 
(2) In any malpractice action against a health care provider, 
as defined in Section 78-14-3, the court shall, at the request of 
any party, order that future damages which equal or exceed 
$100,000, less amounts payable for attorney's fees and other 
costs which are due at the time of judgment, shall be paid by 
periodic payments rather than by a lump sum payment. 
(3) In rendering a judgment which orders the payment of 
future damages by periodic payments, the court shall order 
periodic payments to provide a fair correlation between the 
sustaining of losses and the payment of damages. Lost future 
earnings shall be paid over the judgment creditor's work life 
expectancy. The court shall also order, when appropriate, that 
periodic payments increase at a fixed rate, equal to the rate of 
inflation which the finder of fact used to determine the amount 
of future damages, or as measured by the most recent Con-
sumer Price Index applicable to Utah for all goods and 
services. The present cash value of all periodic payments shall 
equal the fact finder's award of future damages, less any 
amount paid for attorney's fees and costs. The present cash 
value of periodic payments shall be determined by discounting 
the total amount of periodic payments projected over the 
judgment creditor's life expectancy, by the rate of interest 
which the finder of fact used to reduce the amount of future 
damages to present value, or the rate of interest available at 
the time of trial on one year U.S. Government Treasury Bills. 
Before periodic payments of future damages may be ordered, 
the court shall require a judgment debtor to post security 
which assures full payment of those damages. Security for 
payment of a judgment of periodic payments may be in one or 
more of the following forms: 
(a) a bond executed by a qualified insurer; 
(b) an annuity contract executed by a qualified insurer; 
(c) evidence of applicable and collectable liability insur-
ance with one or more qualified insurers; 
(d) an agreement by one or more qualified insurers to 
guarantee payment of the judgment; or 
(e) any other form of security approved by the court. 
Security which complies with this section may also serve as 
a supersedeas bond, where one is required. 
(4) A judgment which orders payment of future damages by 
periodic payments shall specify the recipient or recipients of 
the payments, the dollar amount of the payments, the interval 
between payments, and the number of payments or the period 
of time over which payments shall be made. Those payments 
may only be modified in the event of the death of the judgment 
creditor. 
(5) If the court finds that the judgment debtor, or the 
assignee of his obligation to make periodic payments, has 
failed to make periodic payments as ordered by the court, it 
shall, in addition to the required periodic payments, order the 
judgment debtor or his assignee to pay the judgment creditor 
all damages caused by the failure to make payments, includ-
ing court costs and attorney's fees. 
(6) The obligation to make periodic payments for all future 
damages, other than damages for loss of future earnings, shall 
cease upon the death of the judgment creditor. Damages 
awarded for loss of future earnings shall not be reduced or 
payments terminated by reason of the death of the judgment 
creditor, but shall be paid to persons to whom the judgment 
creditor owed a duty of support, as provided by law, immedi-
ately prior to his death. In that case the court which rendered 
the original judgment may, upon petition of any party in 
interest, modify the judgment to award and apportion the 
unpaid future damages in accordance with this section. 
(7) If security is posted in accordance with Subsection (3), 
and approved by a final judgment entered under this section, 
the judgment is considered to be satisfied, and the judgment 
debtor on whose behalf the security is posted shall be dis-
charged. 1992 
78-14-10. Actions under Utah Governmental Immunity 
Act. 
The provisions of this act shall apply to malpractice actions 
against health care providers which are brought under the 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act insofar as they are appli-
cable; provided, however, tha t this act shall in no way affect 
the requirements for filing notices of claims, times for com-
mencing actions and limitations on amounts recoverable un-
der the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. 1976 
78-14-11. Act not retroactive — Exception. 
The provisions of this act, with the exception of the provi-
sions relating to the limitation on the time for commencing an 
action, shall not apply to injuries, death or services rendered 
which occurred prior to the effective date of this act. 1976 
78-14-12. Division to provide panel — Exemption — 
Procedures — Statute of limitations tolled — 
Composition of panel — Expenses — Division 
authorized to set license fees. 
(1) (a) The division shall provide a hearing panel in alleged 
medical liability cases against health care providers as 
defined in Section 78-14-3, except dentists. 
(b) (i) The division shall establish procedures for 
prelitigation consideration of medical liability claims 
for damages arising out of the provision of or alleged 
failure to provide health care. 
(ii) The division may establish rules necessary to 
administer the process and procedures related to 
prelitigation hearings and the conduct of 
prelitigation hearings in accordance with Sections 
78-14-12 through 78-14-16. 
(c) The proceedings are informal, nonbinding, and are 
not subject to Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative 
Procedures Act, but are compulsory as a condition prece-
dent to commencing litigation. 
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(d) Proceedings conducted under authority of this sec-
tion are confidential, privileged, and immune from civil 
process. 
(2) (a) The party initiating a medical liability action shall 
file a request for prelitigation panel review with the 
division within 60 days after the service of a statutory 
notice of intent to commence action under Section 78-14-8. 
(b) The request shall include a copy of the notice of 
intent to commence action. The request shall be mailed to 
all health care providers named in the notice and request. 
(3) (a) The filing of a request for prelitigation panel review 
under this section tolls the applicable statute of limita-
tions until the earlier of 60 days following the division's 
issuance of an opinion by the prelitigation panel, or 60 
days following the termination of jurisdiction by the 
division as provided in this subsection. The division shall 
send any opinion issued by the panel to all parties by 
regular mail. 
(b) (i) The division shall complete a prelitigation hear-
ing under this section within 180 days after the filing 
of the request for prelitigation panel review, or within 
any longer period as agreed upon in writing by all 
parties to the review. 
(ii) If the prelitigation hearing has not been com-
pleted within the time limits established in Subsec-
tion (3)(b)(i), the division has no further jurisdiction 
over the matter subject to review and the claimant is 
considered to have complied with all conditions pre-
cedent required under this section prior to the com-
mencement of litigation. 
(c) (i) The claimant and any respondent may agree by 
written stipulation that no useful purpose would be 
served by convening a prelitigation panel under this 
section. 
(ii) When the stipulation is filed with the division, 
the division shall within ten days after receipt enter 
an order divesting itself of jurisdiction over the claim, 
as it concerns the stipulating respondent, and stating 
that the claimant has complied with all conditions 
precedent to the commencement of litigation regard-
ing the claim. 
(4) The division shall provide for and appoint an appropri-
ate panel or panels to hear complaints of medical liability and 
damages, made by or on behalf of any patient who is an 
alleged victim of medical liability. The panels are composed of: 
(a) one member who is a resident lawyer currently 
licensed and in good standing to practice law in this state 
and who shall serve as chairman of the panel, who is 
appointed by the division from among qualified individu-
als who have registered with the division indicating a 
willingness to serve as panel members, and a willingness 
to comply with the rules of professional conduct governing 
lawyers in the state of Utah, and who has completed 
division training regarding conduct of panel hearings; 
(b) (i) one member who is a licensed health care pro-
vider listed under Section 78-14-3, who is practicing 
and knowledgeable in the same specialty as the 
proposed defendant, and who is appointed by the 
division in accordance with Subsection (5); or 
(ii) in claims against only hospitals or their em-
ployees, one member who is an individual currently 
serving in a hospital administration position directly 
related to hospital operations or conduct that in-
cludes responsibility for the area of practice that is 
the subject of the liability claim, and who is appointed 
by the division; and 
(c) a lay panelist who is not a lawyer, doctor, hospital 
employee, or other health care provider, and who is a 
responsible citizen of the state, selected and appointed by 
the division from among individuals who have completed 
division training with respect to panel hearings. 
(5) (a) Each person listed as a health care provider in 
Section 78-14-3 and practicing under a license issued by 
the state, is obligated as a condition of holding that 
license to participate as a member of a medical liability 
prelitigation panel at reasonable times, places, and inter-
vals, upon issuance, with advance notice given in a 
reasonable time frame, by the division of an Order to 
Participate as a Medical Liability Prelitigation Panel 
Member. 
(b) A licensee may be excused from appearance and 
participation as a panel member upon the division finding 
participation by the licensee will create an unreasonable 
burden or hardship upon the licensee. ..-..• 
(c) A licensee whom the division finds failed to appear 
and participate as a panel member when so ordered, 
without adequate explanation or justification and without 
being excused for cause by the division, may be assessed 
an administrative fine not to exceed $5,000. 
(d) A licensee whom the division finds intentionally or 
repeatedly failed to appear and participate as a panel 
member when so ordered, without adequate explanation 
or justification and without being excused for cause by the 
division, may be assessed an administrative fine not to 
exceed $5,000, and is guilty of unprofessional conduct. 
(e) All fines collected under Subsections (5)(c) and (d) 
shall be deposited in the Physicians Education Account 
created in Section 58-67a-l. 
(6) Each person selected as a panel member shall certify, 
under oath, that he has no bias or conflict of interest with 
respect to any matter under consideration. 
(7) Members of the prelitigation hearing panels shall re-
ceive per diem compensation and travel expenses for attend-
ing panel hearings as established by rules of the division. 
(8) (a) In addition to the actual cost of administering the 
licensure of health care providers, the division may set 
license fees of health care providers within the limits 
established by law equal to their proportionate costs of 
administering prelitigation panels. 
(b) The claimant bears none of the costs of administer-
ing the prelitigation panel except under Section 78-14-16. 
1997 
78-14-13. Proceedings — Authority of panel — Rights 
of parties to proceedings. 
(1) No record of the proceedings is required and all evi-
dence, documents, and exhibits are returned to the parties or 
witnesses who provided the evidence, documents, and exhibits 
at the end of the proceedings upon the request of the parties or 
witnesses who provided the evidence. 
(2) The division may issue subpoenas for medical records 
directly related to the claim of medical liability in accordance 
with division rule and in compliance with the following: 
(a) the subpoena shall be prepared by the requesting 
party in proper form for issuance by the division; and 
(b) the subpoena shall be accompanied by: 
(i) an affidavit prepared by the person requesting 
the subpoena attesting to the fact the medical record 
subject to subpoena is believed to be directly related 
to the medical liability claim to which the subpoena is 
related; or 
(ii) by a written release for the medical records to 
be provided to the person requesting the subpoena, 
signed by the individual who is the subject of the 
medical record or by that individual's guardian or 
conservator. 
(3) Per diem reimbursement to panel members and ex-
penses incurred by the panel in the conduct of prelitigation 
panel hearings shall be paid by the division. Expenses related 
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to subpoenas are paid by the requesting party, including 
witness fees and mileage. 
(4) The proceedings are informal and formal rules of evi-
dence are not applicable. There is no discovery or perpetuation 
of testimony in the proceedings, except upon special order of 
the panel, and for good cause shown demonstrating extraor-
dinary circumstances. 
(5) (a) A party is entitled to attend, personally or with 
counsel, and participate in the proceedings, except upon 
special order of the panel and unanimous agreement of 
the parties. The proceedings are confidential and closed to 
the public. 
(b) No party has the right to cross-examine, rebut, or 
demand that customary formalities of civil trials and 
court proceedings be followed. The panel may, however, 
request special or supplemental participation of some or 
all parties in particular respects. -
(c) Communications between the panel and the parties, 
except the testimony of the parties on the merits of the 
dispute, are disclosed to all other parties. 
(6) The division shall appoint a panel to consider the claim 
and set the matter for panel review as soon as practicable after 
receipt of a request. 
(7) Parties may be represented by counsel in proceedings 
before a panel. 1994 
78-14-14. Decision and recommendations of panel — 
No judicial or other review. 
The panel shall render its opinion in writing not later than 
30 days after the end of the proceedings. The panel shall 
determine on the basis of the evidence whether each claim 
against each health care provider has merit or has no merit 
and, if meritorious, whether the conduct complained of re-
sulted in harm to the claimant. 
There is no judicial or other review or appeal of the panel's 
decision or recommendations. 1985 
78-14-15. Evidence of proceedings not admissible in 
subsequent action — Panelist may not be 
compelled to testify — Immunity of panelist 
from civil liability — Information regarding 
professional conduct. 
(1) Evidence of the proceedings conducted by the medical 
review panel and its results, opinions, findings, and determi-
nations are not admissible as evidence in an action subse-
quently brought by the claimant in a court of competent 
jurisdiction. 
(2) No panelist may be compelled to testify in a civil action 
subsequently filed with regard to the subject matter of the 
panel's review. A panelist has immunity from civil liability 
arising from participation as a panelist and for all communi-
cations, findings, opinions, and conclusions made in the course 
and scope of duties prescribed by this section. 
(3) Nothing in this chapter may be interpreted to prohibit 
the division from considering any information contained in a 
statutory notice of intent to commence action, request for 
prelitigation panel review, or written findings of a panel with 
respect to the division's determining whether a licensee en-
gaged in unprofessional or unlawful conduct. 1994 
78-14-16. Proceedings considered a b inding arbitra-
t ion hearing upon writ ten agreement of par-
t ies — Compensat ion to members of panel . 
Upon written agreement by all parties, the proceeding may 
be considered a binding arbitration hearing and proceed under 
Title 78, Chapter 31a, except for the selection of the panel, 
which is done as set forth in Subsection 78-14-12(4). If the 
proceeding is considered an arbitration proceeding, the parties 
are equally responsible for compensation to the members of 
the panel for services rendered. 1985 
78-14-17. Arbitration agreements . 
(1) After May 2, 1999, for a binding arbitration agreement 
between a patient and a health care provider to be validly 
executed or, if the requirements of this Subsection (1) have not 
been previously met on at least one occasion, renewed: 
(a) the patient shall be given, in writing and by verbal 
explanation, the following information on: 
(i) the requirement that the patient must arbitrate 
a claim instead of having the claim heard by a judge 
or jury; 
(ii) the role of an arbitrator and the manner in 
which arbitrators are selected under the agreement; 
(iii) the patient's responsibility, if any, for arbitra-
tion-related costs under the agreement; 
(iv) the right of the patient to decline to enter into 
the agreement and still receive health care; 
(v) the automatic renewal of the agreement each 
year unless the agreement is canceled in writing 
before the renewal date; and 
(vi) the right of the patient to have questions about 
the arbitration agreement answered; and 
(b) the agreement shall require that: 
(i) one arbitrator be collectively selected by all 
persons claiming damages; 
(ii) one arbitrator be selected by the health care 
provider; 
(iii) a third arbitrator be jointly selected by all 
persons claiming damages and the health care pro-
vider from a list of individuals approved as arbitra-
tors by the state or federal courts of Utah; 
(iv) all parties waive the requirement of Section 
78-14-12 to appear before a hearing panel in a mal-
practice action against a health care provider; 
(v) the patient be given the right to rescind the 
agreement within 30 days of signing the agreement; 
and 
(vi) the term of the agreement be for one year and 
that the agreement be automatically renewed each 
year unless the agreement is canceled in writing by 
the patient or health care provider before the renewal 
date. 
(2) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), a patient may not be 
denied health care of any kind on the sole basis that the 
patient or a person described in Subsection (5) refused to enter 
into a binding arbitration agreement with a health care 
provider. 
(3) A written acknowledgment of having received a written 
and verbal explanation of a binding arbitration agreement 
signed by or on behalf of the patient shall be a defense to a 
claim that the patient did not receive a written and verbal 
explanation of the agreement as required by Subsection (1) 
unless the patient: 
(a) proves that the person who signed the agreement 
lacked the capacity to do so; or 
(b) shows by clear and convincing evidence that the 
execution of the agreement was induced by the health 
care provider's affirmative acts of fraudulent misrepre-
sentation or fraudulent omission to state material facts. 
(4) The requirements of Subsection (1) do not apply to a 
claim governed by a binding arbitration agreement that was 
executed or renewed before May 3, 1999. 
(5) A legal guardian or a person described in Subsection 
78-14-5(4), except a person temporarily standing in loco pa-
rentis, may execute or rescind a binding arbitration agree-
ment on behalf of a patient. 
(6) This section does not apply to any arbitration agreement 
that is subject to the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. Sec. 1 
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L The client record department shall be under the 
ection of a registered record administrator, RRA, 
an accredited record technician, ART. 
1. If a RRA or an ART is not employed at least part 
le, the facility shall consult at least semi-annually 
:h a RRA or ART according to the needs of the 
ility. 
L203 Retention and Storage 
\ . Provision shall be made for the filing, safe stor-
B, and easy accessibility of client records. 
L. The record and its contents shall be safeguarded 
m loss, defacement, tampering, fires, and floods. 
2. Records shall be protected against access by un-
thorized individuals. 
B. Client records shall be retained for at least seven 
ars after the last date of client care. Records of 
nors shall be retained as follows: 
1. at least two years after the minor reaches age 18 
the age of majority; 
2. a minimum of seven years. 
C. All client records shall be retained within the 
cility upon change of ownership. 
D. When a facility ceases operation, provision shall 
! made for appropriate safe storage and prompt re-
ieval of all client records, client indices, and dis-
targes for the period specified in 4.203B. The facility 
ay arrange storage of client records with another 
cility or may return client records to the attending 
lysician who is still in the community. The facility 
tall: 
1. within three business days of closure, notify the 
epartment in writing of the provisions for the safe 
•eservation of records and their location; 
2. publish in a local newspaper the location of all 
Lcility client records. 
E. The facility shall notify the Department in writ-
ig within 10 business days whenever client records 
re inadvertently defaced or destroyed. 
4.204 Signature Authorization 
Computer signatures and rubber stamp signatures 
lay be used in lieu of the written signature of the 
hysician/licensed practitioner if the facility retains 
tie signator's signed statement acknowledging ulti-
late responsibility for the use of the computer or 
tamp signature and specifying the conditions for its 
ise. 
4.300 Services Provided Under Agreements with 
)utside Sources 
4.301 Contracts 
A. If a service required under this subpart is not 
•rovided directly, the facility shall have a written 
Lgreement with an outside program, resource, or ser-
vice to furnish the necessary service, including emer-
gency and other health care. 
B. The agreement shall: 
1. contain the responsibilities, functions, objectives, 
md other terms agreed to by both parties; 
2. provide that the facility is responsible for assur-
ng that the outside services meet the standards for 
juality of services contained in this subpart. 
C. The facility shall assure that outside services 
meet the needs of each client. 
D. If living quarters are not provided in a facility 
owned by the ICF/MR, the ICF/MR remains directly 
responsible for the standards relating to physical en-
vironment that are specified in R432-150-3 and 
R432-152-6. 
4.302 Transfer Agreements 
A. The licensee shall maintain, where appropriate, 
a written transfer agreement with one or more hospi-
tals, or nearby health facilities, to facilitate the 
transfer of clients and essential client information. 
B. The transfer agreement shall include provisions 
for: 
1. criteria for transfer; 
2. appropriate methods of transfer; 
3. transfer of information needed for proper care 
and treatment of the individual transferred; 
4. security and accountability of personal property 
of the individual transferred; 
5. proper notification of hospital and responsible 
person before transfer; 
6. the facility responsible for client care in the pro-
cess of transfer; 
7. client confidentiality. 
4.400 Administrator 
4.401 Qualifications 
A. Each facility shall appoint, in writing, an ad-
ministrator professionally licensed by the Utah De-
partment of Commerce as a nursing home adminis-
trator. 
B. The administrator shall supervise no more than 
one licensed health care facility. 
C. The administrator shall have sufficient freedom 
from other responsibilities and shall be on the prem-
ises of the facility a sufficient number of hours in the 
business day, and at other times as necessary, to per-
mit attention to the management and administration 
of the facility. 
D. The administrator shall designate, in writing, 
the name and title of the person who shall act as 
administrator in any temporary absence of the ad-
ministrator. This person shall have sufficient power, 
authority, and freedom to act in the best interests of 
client safety and well-being. It is not the intent of this 
paragraph to permit an unlicensed de facto adminis-
trator to supplant or replace the designated, licensed 
administrator. 
4.402 Administrator responsibilities 
A. The administrator's responsibilities shall be in-
cluded in a written job description on file in the facil-
ity and available for Department review. 
B. The job description shall include responsibility 
to insure the following duties are fulfilled: 
1. complete, submit, and file all records and reports 
required by the Department; 
2. act as a liaison with the licensee, qualified men-
tal retardation professional, QMRP, and other super-
visory staff of the facility; 
3. respond appropriately to recommendations made 
by the facility committees; 
4. assure that employees are oriented to their job 
functions and receive appropriate and regularly 
scheduled in-service training; 
5. implement policies and procedures for the opera-
tion of the facility; 
6. hire and maintain the required number of li-
censed and nonlicensed staff, as specified in these 
rules, to meet the needs of clients; 
7. maintain facility staffing records for at least the 
preceding 12 months; 
8. secure and update contracts for required profes-
sional and other services not provided directly by the 
facility; 
9. verify all required licenses and permits of staff 
and consultants at the time of hire and/or effective 
date of contract; 
10. review all incident/accident reports and take 
appropriate action. 
a. Incident/accident reports shall be numbered and 
logged in a manner to account for all reports. 
b. Incident/accident reports shall have space for 
written comments by the administrator and, as ap-
919 
propriate, the attending phys 
committee. 
c. Original incident/accident 
on file in the facility and shall 1 
by the Department. 
4.500 Staff and Personnel 
4.501 Staff Qualifications a 
A. The administrator, QMR] 
pervisors shall develop job des< 
tion including job title, job sum 
qualifications, required skills a 
cal requirements. 
B. Periodic employee per 
shall be documented. 
C. All personnel shall have ( 
and procedure manuals and ot 
sary to effectively perform du 
sponsibilities. 
4.502 Health Surveillance 
A. The facility shall establi 
dures for the health screening < 
to identify communicable dise 
sions, or any other situation wl 
employee from performing assi 
factory manner. This screenii 
within the first two weeks of ei 
essary thereafter. 
B. Tuberculin testing of all n 
nel shall be conducted within t 
of employment unless the emp] 
had a previous significant tul 
defined in R386-702-5, Utah 
1. If the tuberculin test is n 
ployee shall be released from fi 
lin testing unless there is free 
exposure to persons with com 
tuberculosis. 
2. If the tuberculin test is si 
ployee has had a significant 
and has not had adequate chei 
amination and evaluation sha 
dance with R386-702-5, Utah 
C. All dietary and other stafl 
obtain a Food Handler's Permi 
department. 
4.600 Client Protections 
4.601 Protection of Clients' 
A. The facility shall ensure t 
B. The facility shall: 
1. inform each client, pare 
minor, or legal guardian, of the 
rules of the facility; 
2. inform each client, pare 
minor, or legal guardian, of th 
dition, developmental and be! 
dant risks of treatment, and 
treatment; 
3. allow and encourage indi 
cise their rights as clients of tl 
zens of the United States, incl 
complaints, and the right to ( 
client shall be afforded the opp< 
ances and recommend changes 
dures to facility staff and outs 
personal choice, free from rest] 
ercion, discrimination, or repi 
4. allow individual clients t< 
cial affairs and teach them to 
their capabilities; 
5. ensure that clients are not 
verbal, sexual or psychological 
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shall be given by the facility to the State Medical 
Examiner and the registrar of the local probate court 
and a copy of said notice shall be filed with the De-
partment. 
G. Upon sale of the facility or other transfer of own-
ership, the facility shall provide the new owner with 
a written accounting, prepared by an independent 
Certified Public Accountant, of all client funds being 
transferred, and obtain a written receipt for those 
funds from the new owner. 
4.603 Communication with Clients, Parents, and 
Guardians 
The facility shall: 
A. promote participation of parents (if the client is 
a minor) and legal guardians in the process of provid-
ing active treatment to a client unless their participa-
tion is unobtainable or inappropriate; 
B. answer communications from clients' families 
and friends promptly and appropriately; 
C. promote visits by individuals with a relationship 
to the client, such as family, close friends, legal 
guardians and advocates, at any reasonable hour, 
without prior notice, consistent with the right of the 
client's and other clients' privacy, unless the interdis-
ciplinary team determines that the visit would not be 
appropriate for that client; 
D. promote visits by parents or guardians to any 
area of the facility that provides direct client care 
services to the client, consistent with right of that 
client's and other clients' privacy; 
E. promote frequent and informal leaves from the 
facility for visits, trips, or vacations; 
F. notify promptly the client's parents or guardian 
of any significant incidents, or changes in the client's 
condition including, but not limited to, serious ill-
ness, accident, death, abuse, or unauthorized absence. 
4.604 Staff Treatment of Clients 
A. The facility shall develop and implement writ-
ten policies and procedures that prohibit mistreat-
ment, neglect or abuse of the client. 
1. Staff of the facility shall not use physical, verbal, 
sexual or psychological abuse or punishment. 
2. Staff shall not punish a client by withholding 
food or hydration that contributes to a nutritionally 
adequate diet. 
3. The facility shall prohibit the employment of in-
dividuals with a conviction or prior employment his-
tory of child, client abuse, spouse abuse, neglect or 
mistreatment. 
B. The facility shall ensure that all allegations of 
mistreatment, neglect or abuse, as well as injuries of 
unknown source, are reported immediately to the ad-
ministrator and to other officials in accordance with 
Title 62A, Chapter 3, Part 3, and Chapter 4, Part 5, 
Utah Code, through established procedures. 
C. The facility shall have evidence that all alleged 
violations are thoroughly investigated and shall pre-
vent further potential abuse while the investigation 
is in progress. 
D. The results of all investigations shall be re-
ported to the administrator or designated representa-
tive and to other officials in accordance with Title 
62A, Chapter 3, Part 3, and Chapter 4, Part 5, Utah 
Code, within five working days of the incident and, if 
the alleged violation is verified, appropriate correc-
tive action shall be taken. 
4.700 Facility Staffing 
4.701 Qualified Mental Retardation Professional 
A. Each client's active treatment program shall be 
integrated, coordinated and monitored by a qualified 
mental retardation professional. 
B. The qualified mental retardation professional 
shall: 
1. have at least one year of experience working di-
rectly with persons with mental retardation or other 
developmental disabilities; and 
2. be one of the following: 
a. a doctor of medicine and/or osteopathy; 
b. a registered nurse; 
c. an individual who holds at least a bachelor's de-
gree in a professional category specified in 4.702 be-
low. 
4.702 Professional Program Services 
A. Each client shall receive the professional pro-
gram services needed to implement the active treat-
ment program defined by each client's individual pro-
gram plan. Professional program staff shall work di-
rectly with clients and with paraprofessional, nonpro-
fessional and other professional program staff who 
work with clients. 
B. The facility shall have available enough quali-
fied professional staff to carry out and monitor the 
various professional interventions in accordance with 
the stated goals and objectives of every individual 
program plan. 
C. Professional program staff shall participate as 
members of the interdisciplinary team in relevant as-
pects of the active treatment process. 
D. Professional program staff shall participate in 
on-going staff development and training in both for-
mal and informal settings with other professional, 
paraprofessional and nonprofessional staff members. 
E. Professional program staff shall be licensed, cer-
tified, or registered, as applicable, to provide profes-
sional services in the state of Utah. 
1. To be designated as an occupational therapist, an 
individual shall be licensed in accordance with Title 
58, Chapter 42, Utah Code. 
2. To be designated as an occupational therapy as-
sistant, an individual shall be licensed in accordance 
with Title 58, Chapter 42, Utah Code. 
3. To be designated as a physical therapist, an indi-
vidual shall be licensed in accordance with Title 58, 
Chapter 24, Utah Code. 
4. To be designated as a physical therapy assistant, 
an individual shall be licensed in accordance with 
Title 58, Chapter 24, Utah Code. 
5. To be designated as a psychologist, an individual 
shall be licensed in accordance with Title 58, Chapter 
25, Utah Code. 
6. To be designated as a social worker, an individ-
ual shall be licensed in accordance with Title 58, 
Chapter 35, Utah Code. 
7. To be designated as a speech-language patholo-
gist or audiologist, an individual shall be licensed in 
accordance with Title 58, Chapter 41, Utah Code. 
8. To be designated as a professional recreation 
staff member, an individual shall be licensed in ac-
cordance with Title 58, Chapter 40, Utah Code. 
F. Those professional program staff who do not fall 
under the jurisdiction of state licensure, certification, 
or registration requirements, specified in Title 58, 
Utah Code, shall meet the following qualifications: 
1. to be designated as a professional dietitian, an 
individual shall be eligible for registration by the 
American Dietetics Association; 
2. to be designated as a human services profes-
sional, an individual shall have at least a bachelor's 
degree in a human services field, including, but not 
limited to: sociology, special education, rehabilitation 
counseling, and psychology. 
G. If the client's individual program plan is being 
successfully implemented by facility staff, profes-
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sional program staff meeting the qualifications of 
4.702 are not required: 
1. except for qualified mental retardation profes-
sionals; 
2. except for the requirements of 4.702B of this sec-
tion concerning the facility's provision of enough* 
qualified professional program staff; 
3. unless otherwise specified by State licensure and 
certification requirements. 
4.703 Direct Care Staffing 
A. The facility shall not depend upon clients or vol-
unteers to perform direct care services for the facility. 
B. There shall be responsible direct care staff on 
duty and awake on a 24-hour basis, when clients are 
present, to take prompt, appropriate action in case of 
injury, illness, fire or other emergency, in each de-
fined residential living unit housing: 
1. clients for whom a physician has ordered a medi-
cal care plan; 
2. clients who are aggressive, assaultive or security 
risks; 
3. more than 16 clients; 
4. Sixteen or fewer clients within a multi-unit 
building. 
C. There shall be a responsible direct care staff per-
son on duty on a 24-hour basis, when clients are 
present, to respond to injuries and symptoms of ill-
ness, and to handle emergencies, in each defined resi-
dential living unit housing: 
1. clients for whom a physician has not ordered a 
medical care plan; 
2. clients who are not aggressive, assaultive or se-
curity risks; 
3. sixteen or fewer clients. 
D. The facility shall provide sufficient support staff 
so that direct care staff are not required to perform 
support services to the extent that these duties inter-
fere with the exercise of their primary direct client 
care duties. 
4.704 Residential Living Unit Staff 
A. The facility shall provide sufficient direct care 
staff to manage and supervise clients in accordance 
with their individual program plans. 
B. Direct care staff are defined as the present on-
duty staff calculated over all shifts in a 24-hour pe-
riod for each defined residential living unit. 
C. Direct care staff shall be provided by the facility 
in the following minimum ratios of direct care staff to 
clients: 
1. for each defined residential living unit serving 
children under the age of 12, severely and profoundly 
retarded clients, clients with severe physical disabili-
ties, or clients who are aggressive, assaultive, or se-
curity risks, or who manifest severely hyperactive or 
psychotic-like behavior, the staff to client ratio is 1 to 
3.2 (2.5 hours per client per 24 hour period); 
2. for each defined residential living unit serving 
moderately retarded clients, the staff to client ratio is 
1 to 4 (2.0 hours per client per 24 hour period); 
3. for each defined residential living unit serving 
clients who function within the range of mild retarda-
tion, the staff to client ratio is 1 to 6.4 (1.25 hours per 
client per 24 hour period). 
D. When there are no clients present in the living 
unit, a responsible staff member shall be available by 
telephone. 
4.705 Staff Training Program 
A. The facility shall provide each employee with 
initial and continuing training that enables the em-
ployee to perform his or her duties effectively, effi-
ciently, and competently. 
B. For employees who work with clients, training 
shall focus on skills and competencies directed toward 
clients' developmental, behavioral, and health needs. 
C. Staff shall be able to demonstrate the skills and 
techniques necessary to administer interventions to 
manage the inappropriate behavior of clients. 
D. Staff shall be able to demonstrate the skills and 
techniques necessary to implement the individual 
program plans for each client for whom they are re-
sponsible. 
4.706 Volunteers 
A. Volunteers may be utilized in the daily activi-
ties of the facility but may not be included in the 
facility's staffing plan in lieu of facility employees. 
B. Volunteers shall be supervised and familiar with 
a client's rights and the facility's policies and proce-
dures. 
C. Volunteers who provide personal care to clients 
shall be adequately screened, at least 18 years of age, 
or at least 16 years of age and under the direct super-
vision of a qualified employee. 
R432-152-5. Client Treatment Services. 
5.100 Active Treatment Services 
5.101 Active Treatment 
A. Each client shall receive a continuous active 
treatment program, which includes aggressive, con-
sistent implementation of a program of specialized 
and generic training, treatment, health services and 
related services described in this subpart that is di-
rected toward: 
1. the acquisition of the behaviors necessary for the 
client to function with as much self determination 
and independence as possible; 
2. the prevention or deceleration of regression or 
loss of current optimal function status. 
B. Active treatment does not include services to 
maintain generally independent clients who are able 
to function with little supervision or in the absence of 
an aggressive, consistent, continuously implemented 
program. 
5.102 Admissions, Transfers, and Discharge 
A. Clients who are admitted by the facility shall be 
in need of and receiving active treatment services. 
B. Admission decisions shall be based on a prelimi-
nary evaluation of the client that is conducted or 
updated by the facility or by outside sources. 
C. A preliminary evaluation shall contain back-
ground information as well as currently valid assess-
ments of functional developmental, behavioral, so-
cial, health and nutritional status to determine if the 
facility can provide for the client's needs and if the 
client is likely to benefit from placement in the facil-
ity. 
D. If a client is to be either transferred or dis-
charged, the facility shall: 
1. have documentation in the client's record that 
the client was transferred or discharged for good 
cause; 
2. provide a reasonable time, except in emergen-
cies, to prepare the client and his or her parents or 
guardian for the transfer or discharge. 
E. At the time of discharge, the facility shall: 
1. develop a final summary of the client's develop-
mental, behavioral, social, health and nutritional sta-
tus and, with the consent of the client, parents, if the 
client is a minor, or legal guardian, provide a copy to 
authorized persons and agencies; 
2. provide a post-discharge plan of care that will 
assist the client to adjust to the new living environ-
ment. 
5.103 Individual Program Plan 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
432-152-5 HEALTH 922 
A. Each client shall have an individual program 
an developed by an interdisciplinary team that rep-
sents the professions, disciplines or service areas 
at are relevant to: 
1. identifying the client's needs, as described by the 
mprehensive functional assessments required in 
L03C; 
2. designing programs that meet the client's needs. 
B. Appropriate facility staff shall participate in in-
rdisciplinary team meetings. Participation by other 
encies serving the client is encouraged. Participa-
>n by the client, client's parent, if the client is a 
inor, or the client's legal guardian is required un-
3S that participation is unobtainable or inappropri-
e. 
C. Within 30 days after admission, the interdisci-
inary team shall perform accurate assessments or 
assessments as needed to supplement the prelimi-
iry evaluation conducted prior to admission. The 
mprehensive functional assessment shall take into 
nsideration the client's age, for example, child, 
ung adult, or elderly person, and the implications 
r active treatment at each stage, as applicable, and 
all: 
1. identify the presenting problems and disabilities 
Ld where possible, their causes; 
2. identify a client's specific developmental 
rengths; 
3. identify a client's specific developmental and be-
ivioral management needs; 
4. identify a client's need for services without re-
rd to the actual availability of the services needed; 
5. include physical development and health, nutri-
>nal status, sensorimotor development, affective de-
lopment, speech and language development, audi-
ry functioning, cognitive development, social devel-
ment, adaptive behaviors and independent living 
ills necessary for a client to be able to function in 
e community, and as applicable, vocational skills. 
D. Within 30 days after admission, the interdisci-
inary team shall prepare for each client an individ-
il program plan that states the specific objectives 
scessary to meet the client's needs, as identified by 
e comprehensive assessment required by 5.103C, 
id the planned sequence for dealing with those 
jectives. These objectives shall: 
1. be stated separately, in terms of a single behav-
ral outcome; 
2. be assigned projected completion dates; 
3. be expressed in behavioral terms that provide 
easurable indices of performance; 
4. be organized to reflect a developmental progres-
3n appropriate to the individual; 
5. be assigned priorities. 
E. Each written training program designed to im-
ement the objectives in the individual program plan 
tall specify: 
1. the methods to be used; 
2. the schedule for use of the method; 
3. the person responsible for the program; 
4. the type of data and frequency of data collection 
jcessary to be able to assess progress toward the 
jsired objectives; 
5. the inappropriate client behavior, if applicable; 
6. provision for the appropriate expression of be-
ivior and the replacement of inappropriate behav-
r, if applicable, with behavior that is adaptive or 
>propriate. 
F. The individual program plan shall also: 
1. describe relevant interventions to support the 
dividual toward independence; 
2. identify the location where program strategy in-
formation, which shall be accessible to any person 
responsible for implementation, can be found; 
3. include, for those clients who lack them, training 
in personal skills essential for privacy and indepen-
dence, including, but not limited to, toilet training, 
personal hygiene, dental hygiene, self-feeding, bath-
ing, dressing, grooming, and communication of basic 
needs, until it has been demonstrated that the client 
is developmentally incapable of acquiring them; 
4. identify mechanical supports, if needed, to 
achieve proper body position, balance, or alignment. 
The plan shall specify the reason for each support, the 
situations in which each is to be applied, and a sched-
ule for the use of each support; 
5. provide that clients who have multiple disabling 
conditions spend a major portion of each waking day 
out of bed and outside the bedroom area, moving 
about by various methods and devices whenever pos-
sible; 
6. include opportunities for client choice and self-
management. 
G. A copy of each client's individual program plan 
shall be made available to all relevant staff, includ-
ing staff of other agencies who work with the client, 
and to the client, parents, if the client is a minor, or 
legal guardian. 
5.104 Program Implementation 
A. As soon as the interdisciplinary team has formu-
lated a client's individual program plan, each client 
shall receive a continuous active treatment program 
consisting of needed interventions and services in suf-
ficient number and frequency to support the achieve-
ment of the objectives identified in the individual pro-
gram plan. 
B. The facility shall develop an active treatment 
schedule that outlines the current active treatment 
program and that is readily available for review by 
relevant staff. 
C. Except for those facets of the individual program 
plan that shall be implemented only by licensed per-
sonnel, each client's individual program plan shall be 
implemented by all staff who work with the client, 
including professional, paraprofessional, and nonpro-
fessional staff. 
5.105 Program Documentation 
A. Data relative to accomplishment of the criteria 
specified in client individual program plan objectives 
shall be documented in measurable terms. 
B. The facility shall document significant events 
that are related to the client's individual program 
plan and assessments and that contribute to an over-
all understanding of the client's ongoing level and 
quality of functioning. 
5.106 Program Monitoring and Change 
A. The individual program plan shall be reviewed 
at least by the qualified mental retardation profes-
sional and revised as necessary, including, but not 
limited to, situations in which the client: 
1. has successfully completed an objective or objec-
tives identified in the individual program plan; 
2. is regressing or losing skills already gained; 
3. is failing to progress toward identified objectives 
after reasonable efforts have been made; 
4. is being considered for training towards new 
objectives. 
B. At least annually, the comprehensive functional 
assessment of each client shall be reviewed by the 
interdisciplinary team for relevancy and updated as 
needed, and the individual program plan shall be re-
vised, as appropriate, repeating the process set forth 
in 5.103. 
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C. The facility shall designate and use a specially 
constituted committee or committees consisting of 
members of the facility staff, parents, legal guard-
ians, clients as appropriate, qualified persons who 
have experience or training in contemporary prac-
tices to change inappropriate client behavior, and 
persons with no ownership or controlling interest in 
the facility to: 
1. review, approve, and monitor individual pro-
grams designed to manage inappropriate behavior 
and other programs that, in the opinion of the com-
mittee, involve risks to client protection and rights; 
2. insure that these programs are conducted only 
with the written informed consent of the client, par-
ent, if the client is a minor, or legal guardian; 
3. review, monitor and make suggestions to the fa-
cility about its practices and programs as they relate 
to drug usage, physical restraints, time-out rooms, 
application of painful or noxious stimuli, control of 
inappropriate behavior, protection of client rights 
and funds, and any other area that the committee 
believes need to be addressed. 
D. The provisions of paragraph 5.106C may be 
modified only if in the judgment of the state survey 
agency, court decrees, state law or regulations pro-
vide for equivalent client protection and consultation. 
5.200 Client Behavior and Facility Practices 
5.201 Conduct Toward Clients 
A. The facility shall develop and implement writ-
ten policies and procedures for the management of 
conduct between staff and clients. These policies and 
procedures shall: 
1. promote the growth, development and indepen-
dence of the client; 
2. address the extent to which client choice will be 
accommodated in daily decision-making, emphasiz-
ing self-determination and self-management, to the 
extent possible; 
3. specify client conduct to be allowed or not al-
lowed; 
4. be available to all staff, clients, parents of minor 
children, and legal guardians. 
B. To the extent possible, clients shall participate 
in the formulation of these policies and procedures. 
C. Clients shall not discipline other clients, except 
as part of an organized system of self-government, as 
set forth in facility policy. 
5.202 Management of Inappropriate Client Behav-
ior 
A. The facility shall develop and implement writ-
ten policies and procedures that govern the manage-
ment of inappropriate client behavior. These policies 
and procedures shall be consistent with the provi-
sions of 5.201. These procedures shall: 
1. specify all facility approved interventions to 
manage inappropriate client behavior; 
2. designate these interventions on a hierarchy to 
be implemented, ranging from most positive or least 
intrusive, to least positive or most intrusive; 
3. ensure, prior to the use of more restrictive tech-
niques, that the client's record documents that pro-
grams that incorporate the use of less intrusive or 
more positive techniques have been tried systemati-
cally and demonstrated to be ineffective; 
4. address the following: 
a. the use of time-out rooms; 
b. the use of physical restraints; 
c. the use of drugs to manage inappropriate behav-
ior; 
d. the application of painful or noxious stimuli; 
e. the staff members who may authorize the use of 
specified interventions; 
f. a mechanism for monitoring and controlling the 
use of such interventions. 
B. Interventions to manage inappropriate client be-
havior shall be employed with sufficient safeguards 
and supervision to ensure that the safety, welfare and 
civil and human rights of clients are adequately pro-
tected. 
C. Techniques to manage inappropriate client be-
havior shall never be used for disciplinary purposes, 
for the convenience of staff or as a substitute for an 
active treatment program. 
D. The use of systematic interventions to manage 
inappropriate client behavior shall be incorporated 
into the client's individual program plan, in accor-
dance with 5.103D and E. 
E. Standing or as needed programs to control inap-
propriate behavior are not permitted. 
5.203 Time-Out Rooms 
A. A client may be placed in a room from which 
egress is prevented only if the following conditions 
are met: 
1. The placement is part of an approved systematic 
time-out program as required by 5.202. Thus, emer-
gency placement of a client into a time-out room is 
not allowed. 
2. The client is under the direct constant visual 
supervision of designated staff. 
3. The door to the room is held shut by staff or by a 
mechanism requiring constant physical pressure 
from a staff member to keep the mechanism engaged. 
B. Placement of a client in a time-out room shall 
not exceed one hour. 
C. Clients placed in time-out rooms shall be pro-
tected from hazardous conditions including, but not 
limited to, presence of sharp corners and objects, un-
covered light fixtures, unprotected electrical outlets. 
D. A log of the use of each time-out room shall be 
kept. 
5.204 Physical Restraints 
A. The facility may employ physical restraint only: 
1. as an integral part of an individual program plan 
that is intended to lead to less restrictive means of 
managing and eliminating the behavior for which the 
restraint is applied; 
2. as an emergency measure, but only if absolutely 
necessary to protect the client or others from injury; 
3. as a health-related protection prescribed by a 
physician, but only if absolutely necessary during the 
conduct of a specific medical or surgical procedure, or 
only if absolutely necessary for client protection dur-
ing the time that a medical condition exists. 
B. Authorizations to use or extend restraints as an 
emergency shall be: 
1. in effect no longer than 12 consecutive hours; 
2. obtained as soon as the client is restrained or 
stable. 
C. The facility shall not issue orders for restraint 
on a standing or as needed basis. 
D. A client placed in restraint shall be checked at 
least every 30 minutes by staff trained in the use of 
restraints, released from the restraint as quickly as 
possible, and a record of these checks and usage shall 
be kept. 
E. Restraints shall be designed and used so as not 
to cause physical injury to the client and so as to 
cause the least possible discomfort. 
F. Opportunity for motion and exercise shall be 
provided for a period of not less than 10 minutes dur-
ing each two hour period in which restraint is em-
ployed, and a record of such activity shall be kept. 
G. Barred enclosures shall not be more than three 
feet in height and shall not have tops. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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SEE COURT OF APPEALS RULES 11 AND 12 
Thomas Derek REASONS, by Jean Reasons 
HALL, Petitioner/Appellant, 
v. 
STATE of Tennessee, Defendant/Appellee. 
Court of Appeals of Tennessee, Western Section, at 
Jackson. 
September 8, 1987. 
TN Claims Commission No. 2, Claim No. T4-182, 
Tom Anderson, Commissioner. 
Donna R. Davis of Gilreath & Associates, 
Knoxville, for petitioner/appellant. 
Michael L. Parsons, Office of Attorney General, 
Nashville, and William A. Smith, Jr., Arlington, for 
defendant/appellee. 
TOMLIN, Presiding Judge, Western Section. 
*1 Petitioner, a mentally retarded male, brought 
this action by his mother, as natural guardian, 
against the state of Tennessee, seeking damages. It 
was filed originally with the Board of Claims and 
was later transferred to the Tennessee Claims 
Commission. The petitioner alleged that certain 
employees of the Arlington Developmental Center 
(hereafter 'Center'), an intermediate care facility for 
the mentally retarded, were negligent in the care 
rendered petitioner. Specifically, the petition 
alleged that while eating food prepared at the Center 
petitioner swallowed a bone that lodged in his 
esophagus, resulting in an esophageal perforation 
and infection. Following a hearing, the 
Commissioner found in favor of the State and 
dismissed the petition. Petitioner's appeal presents 
the following issues: (1) whether the Center was 
negligent in allowing bones to be included in the 
meals of a thirty-four-year old person who is 
profoundly retarded; (2) whether the Center was 
negligent in the manner in which its staff cared for 
and observed petitioner following a choking incident 
so as to determine properly whether an obstruction 
was lodged in his throat; and (3) whether negligence 
contributing to a delay in treatment was the 
proximate cause of plaintiffs injuries and damages. 
We resolve each of these issues in favor of the 
defendant. 
Virtually all, if not all, of the material facts in this 
case are not in dispute. Petitioner is a thirty-four-
year old 'profoundly retarded' male. He developed 
mental retardation at the age of seven months when 
he contracted cerebral meningitis. The term 
'profoundly retarded' refers to one who is severely 
retarded. Petitioner has the mental capacity of a 
one-year-old child. He communicates principally 
through hand and body gestures. He can speak only 
two or three words. His usual behavior consists of 
such things as bumping his head against the wall and 
floor, repeatedly biting his hands, removing his 
clothes, incontinence, seizures for which he is given 
medication, and with regularity grabbing food from 
the meal trays of other residents of the Center, 
stuffing it into his mouth. 
The Arlington Developmental Center is located in 
Shelby County. It is operated by the State of 
Tennessee for its citizens who are mentally retarded. 
It is classified by the federal government as an 
'Intermediate Care Facility' for the mentally 
retarded. Part of its funding comes from the federal 
government. 
Petitioner was cared for by his mother at home until 
he was approximately sixteen years of age. He 
became a resident of Arlington Development Center 
in 1971, remaining there until after the incident in 
question. 
While at the Center, petitioner resided in a unit 
named 'Daniel Boone III.' This unit normally 
housed eighteen residents and was staffed twenty-
four hours a day by trained personnel called 
'Developmental Technicians' (DT's). A group of 
eighteen residents would have as few as two DT's 
and as many as four DT's present during any one 
eight-hour shift. Petitioner and other residents of 
Daniel Boone III were served their meals in a small 
dining area in the unit. Specific patients were 
designated as charges for a particular DT who had 
the responsibility of supervising his or her patients 
during their meal time. 
*2 In addition to the above-mentioned staff, there 
were developmental technician supervisors (DTS's), 
nurses and a medical staff along with an infirmary 
provided at the Center. Nurses and at least one staff 
physician were on the premises at all times. 
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On July 10, 1983, petitioner was seen to grab a 
handful of sliced roast beef from the plate of another 
resident and proceed to stuff it in his mouth, as a 
result of which he choked. Reginald Williams, a 
DTS, was working in petitioner's unit at that time 
and observed the incident. He immediately 
performed a procedure similar to the Heimlich 
Maneuver, which caused petitioner to regurgitate the 
roast beef. Williams then proceeded to remove the 
balance of the meat in petitioner's mouth by hand. 
Petitioner was observed both by Williams and the 
nurse on duty to be breathing and functioning 
normally following the incident. 
Body checks of the residents at the Center are made 
at every shift change, which is every eight hours. A 
body check consists of a close personal inspection by 
the DT assigned to that patient. It includes having 
the patient remove the clothes first from the upper 
portion and then from the lower portion of his body. 
The DT then checks the patient for any cuts, 
bruises, abrasions or anything of a physical nature 
out of the ordinary. At a shift change on the 
morning of July 19, 1983, the DTS observed that 
petitioner had substantial swelling in his neck and 
that he refused to swallow. In addition, petitioner 
refused to eat his breakfast and was running a 
temperature of 103 degrees. This information was 
relayed to the nurses on duty who in turn called Dr. 
Armona, one of the staff physicians, to examine 
plaintiff. 
At the time Dr. Armona examined petitioner he 
was not informed of the choking incident of July 
10th, nor was he advised that on the previous day, 
July 18th, it was recorded in the progress notes that 
petitioner had been 'acting very slow as if he was 
very sleepy, vomited a small amount of liquid. No 
foods. Refused to eat his lunch.' 
Following his examination, Dr. Armona turned 
petitioner over to Dr. Carruthers, the staff physician 
who normally attended to petitioner, and he was 
transferred to the infirmary at the Center. 
Following several tests, Dr. Carruthers diagnosed 
petitioner's condition to be a paratonsillar abscess. 
The following morning, July 20th, x-rays of 
petitioner's throat revealed a foreign body lodged 
therein. He was transferred immediately to the City 
of Memphis Hospital, where surgery was performed 
by a Dr. Kavanaugh. During surgery Dr. 
Kavanaugh removed a bone which he and another 
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doctor concluded to be a chicken bone measuring 
one inch by three-quarters of an inch by three-
quarters of an inch. It had lodged in petitioner's 
esophagus and perforated it, causing a serious 
infection. Petitioner was in intensive care for 
approximately twelve weeks. He was discharged on 
October 31, 1983 and thereafter made a complete 
recovery. 
I. PETITIONER'S DIET. 
*3 This issue as presented by petitioner is 
somewhat confusing to the Court. Petitioner 
complains of defendant's providing a diet for 
petitioner that from time to time might contain 
bones. Yet, it is contended on behalf of petitioner 
that the bone on which petitioner choked was found 
in the roast beef which petitioner grabbed from the 
plate of another resident and shoved into his own 
mouth. We are thus faced with the immediate 
question of whether it was a bone in petitioner's 
food or a bone in the food served to another patient. 
There is absolutely no testimony in this record 
reflecting that a bone of any sort was every found in 
any of petitioner's food during the period in 
question. By the same token, the proof in this 
record identifies the bone as a chicken bone, more 
specifically, the head of the femur. The 
uncontradicted proof is also to the effect that the 
meat petitioner grabbed from his fellow patient's 
plate was thinly sliced roast beef-not chicken-and 
that it contained no bones of any sort. 
Petitioner has failed to establish by competent 
expert proof the standard of care in this situation. 
Furthermore, petitioner has failed to establish by 
any proof that defendant breached a standard of care 
On the other hand, Dr. Wellington Mock, 
Assistant Superintendent for Community Services at 
the Center, testified that it was a basic underlying 
policy at the Center, mandated by applicable federal 
guidelines, that to the greatest extent possible, 
residents at the Center were to be 'normalized.' He 
defined normalization as the process of not allowing, 
but encouraging, the patients to develop the best 
rhythm of life possible, and to do so to allow them 
to carry out the customs and routines that are 
normal. As he stated, they were entitled to the 
'dignity of risk,' that in order to allow mentally 
retarded patients to develop to their fullest capacity, 
they should be permitted to run the risks of danger 
or harm in progressing up the ladder o' 
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works / 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Not Reported in S.W.2d 
(Cite as: 1987 WL 16560, *3 (Tenn.App.)) 
Page 8 
development. 
It was required that the staff at the Center develop 
an individual habitation plan for each resident. This 
included the ascertainment and establishment of the 
dietary needs of each resident, following the 
individualized observations by the staff, which 
included a physical therapist, occupational therapist, 
dietician, doctor, nurse, teacher, vocational person, 
social worker, psychologist, aide and team leader. 
Clearly, a resident's dietary needs under these 
circumstances are something outside the scope of 
common knowledge of a layman and require a 
professional determination. As developed, the 
petitioner's diet plan called for a regular diet with 
triple portions. A regular diet did not include in its 
process an active overt screening of each and every 
meal served to petitioner or any other resident 
receiving a regular diet to eliminate absolutely the 
presence of any bones from it. It is our 
responsibility to review the findings of the 
Commissioner de novo upon the record with a 
presumption of correctness. Rule 13(d) T.R.A.P. 
From our review of the record, we hold that the 
evidence does not preponderate against the findings 
of the Commissioner that petitioner failed to 
establish that defendant needed to remove all bones 
from all food served to every profoundly retarded 
patient or resident. 
II. THE CHOKING INCIDENT. 
*4 The thrust of petitioner's second issue is to the 
effect that defendant and its servants and employees 
were negligent in their treatment of petitioner 
following the choking incident of July 10, 1983. 
We find this issue to be completely without merit. 
While petitioner contends that defendant should have 
taken further precautions to assure that petitioner 
had suffered no harm or injury from the choking, a 
reading of the record reveals that petitioner failed to 
present proof to establish just what precautions 
defendant should have taken and what applicable 
standard of care the defendant allegedly violated. 
As noted earlier, a DTS executed the Heimlich 
Maneuver to dislodge the roast beef from 
petitioner's mouth. He then removed the balance of 
the meat from petitioner's mouth by hand. 
Following this incident, the nurse on duty and other 
DT's maintained an observation of petitioner, noting 
that he showed no discoloration, no loss of breathing 
and demonstrated a normal pulse. 
We have heretofore described the body searches 
that are conducted on the residents three times a 
day. One of the compelling reasons for such a 
procedure, as dehumanizing and degrading as it 
might seem to the uneducated layman, lies in the 
fact that people like petitioner, who are profoundly 
retarded, find it virtually impossible to communicate 
pain or other discomfort to others. As presented by 
the proof of the defendant, body searches were 
conducted on the petitioner three times a day from 
July 10 to July 19, with no distress of any type on 
the part of the petitioner being noted until the 
afternoon or evening of July 18th. The evidence 
does not preponderate against the Commissioner's 
findings as to this issue. 
III. THE ALLEGED 'DELAY IN 
TREATMENT.' 
Petitioner has contended that defendant's employees 
were negligent in that they failed to notify a 
physician of the July 10 choking incident, and that 
more specifically on the morning of July 19th when 
a physician was summoned, he was not informed at 
that time of the July 10th incident or of the events 
occurring on July 18. The Commissioner below 
found that members of the staff of the Center were 
negligent in failing to inform the Center's medical 
doctors on July 19th of the choking incident but 
found that this alleged act of negligence was not the 
proximate cause of petitioner's injuries and 
damages. 
A review of the chronology of events is important 
to the consideration of this issue. Petitioner choked 
on thin sliced roast beef on July 10th. The meat was 
removed, his mouth cleared, and he was thereafter 
observed by staff members, including the nurse, 
who found no problems with breathing, swallowing, 
etc. Four DT's testified without contradiction that 
they were with the plaintiff during at least five of 
the nine days between the 10th and the 19th, that 
they observed and assisted him with his meals, and 
that he ate solid foods regularly during this period of 
time without any difficulty. In addition, they 
performed daily body checks three shifts per day, 
noting nothing unusual about petitioner until the 
morning of the 19th. 
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*5 Furthermore, the bone removed from 
petitioner's throat was identified by the doctor who 
removed it as a chicken bone. There was medical 
testimony based upon the nature and size of the bone 
removed that plaintiff could not have ingested solid 
food after the swallowing of the bone. In light of 
the uncontradicted testimony about petitioner's 
eating solid food during this period, in our opinion, 
this evidence rules out the ingestion of the chicken 
bone with the thin sliced roast beef on July 10th. 
Under the circumstances, we see nothing to relate 
the choking incident of the 10th to the findings of 
the 20th so as to justify a finding of negligence on 
the part of the staff in failing to so advise the staff 
physician on the 19th. Furthermore, failure of the 
DT's or the nurse to report to the doctor on the 
morning of the 19th that on the previous afternoon 
petitioner was observed to be lethargic, he vomited a 
small amount of liquid and refused to eat lunch 
would not rise to the dignity of negligence. It also 
should be noted that there was medical testimony to 
the effect that without more information this would 
not cause the doctor to believe that an esophageal 
perforation was the problem. Reviewing the 
evidence on a whole, we are of the opinion that the 
evidence preponderates against the finding of the 
Commissioner that the staff members were negligent 
in failing to inform the doctors on July 19, 1983. In 
addition, if it were considered to be negligence, we 
are also of the opinion that the evidence failed to 
establish a causal relationship between the alleged 
negligence and any of the petitioner's injuries. 
The judgment of the Commissioner is affirmed. 
Costs in this cause are taxed to the petitioner, for 
which execution may issue if necessary. 
HIGHERS AND FARMER, JJ., concur. 
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